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Preface 
This book is the winner of the Africa Thesis Award 2009. The jury’s report in-
cluded the following comments: 
“The jury was very impressed by the quality of Miranda Poeze’s thesis and the 
ingenuity she showed in her research on boat migrants. She has managed to 
record her interviews in such a way that it almost reads like a novel: Pierre and 
Ibrahima come alive as one reads their tales and it is difficult not to become 
emotionally involved in their stories. Miranda convincingly describes why mi-
grants’ decisions to board these boats have to be viewed from a Senegalese 
socio-cultural context. However the thesis is not only very readable, it is a 
thorough piece of research too. Miranda managed to familiarize herself with and 
then gain access to the social environment of boat refugees in a remarkable way. 
The jury was also convinced of the societal relevance of the thesis, particularly 
the way certain difficult topics, such as the migrants’ fears and expectations, their 
financial position, and their (often) forced return to Senegal, are dealt with.”  
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Foreword and acknowledgements 
When the rush to acquire the “mandate” for all aspects related to migration becomes an end 
in itself, the losers inevitably are the migrants, the people who should be, but are not, at the 
centre of the entire migration debate. Too often discussions within this Council [Governing 
Council of the International Organization for Migration] have spoken of migration as an 
abstract, purely economic phenomenon. What has been missing from the debate has been an 
understanding that we are talking about the movement of human beings; individuals who 
become obscured behind the statistics and policy discussions. (Amnesty International 2005) 
The idea for this research was born during an internship at the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the beginning of 2007, where I got first-hand knowledge on 
immigration policies. During this period I became particularly interested in 
policies directed at undocumented migrants, which mostly revolved around 
issues of repatriation and the tightening of external border controls at a time that 
undocumented boat-migration from the West African Coast to the Canary Islands 
had just finished its peak-year. The preceding year European newspapers had 
regularly reported on weakened migrants arriving in small fragile boats and 
mentioned that large amounts of migrants had died on this route. As a result of 
this sea-migration from West Africa towards Europe many organizations in the 
field of migration had set up projects directed at these undocumented boat-
migrants. However, as I soon learned when reading some evaluation reports, a lot 
of them seemed to be rather ineffective. This was not surprising as most of these 
projects were based on common sense knowledge on undocumented migration in 
which the migrant was generally depicted as a purely rational economic being, 
while the actual life world, experiences and motives of the migrants themselves 
were left unexplored by practitioners in the field as well as by social scientists. 
This study is therefore an effort to understand more about undocumented mi-
gration decision-making by giving a voice to those who undertake dangerous 
migration routes and above all to turn these migrants, who often become ob-
scured behind statistics and policy documents, into human beings. 
This work would not have been accomplished without the support of many 
others and therefore I would like to use this space to give a word of gratitude to 
certain people. I owe considerable debt to the young Senegalese men and their 
families in the neighbourhoods of Dakar, who shared their personal and often 
traumatized stories with me. Through them I came to understand why people 
were taking such high risks to move from the West African coast to the Canary 
Islands in small and often fragile boats in an effort to reach European mainland. I 
feel privileged that I had the opportunity to talk with these people and experience 
 xi 
 
another way of living that has broadened my horizon considerably. As my res-
pondents did not have the same privilege as I did to travel to whatever place 
possible, I hope that with this thesis at least their voices and stories will transcend 
geographical as well as cultural borders. 
Also the support and feedback of my supervisors Joost Beuving and Jan 
Abbink has been of great importance during all stages of the research process and 
kept me motivated and going at times when I felt lost in my data. I would like to 
express my gratitude to Abdou Salam Fall for hosting me at the University of 
Dakar and giving me a space to write up my data. In addition, I thank my friends 
in Dakar for taking me up in their lives and for providing a space where I felt at 
home, and I would especially like to mention and thank my dear friends Abdou 
and Moussa for listening to many of my stories and helping me with my strug-
gles in and outside my fieldwork. Namm naa leen. 
Finally, I would like to thank my Senegalese friends in the Netherlands for 
their hospitality and for providing me with some useful contacts in Dakar, and 
last but certainly not least, my close friends and family in the Netherlands for the 
inspiring discussions and their loving support.  
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Executive summary 
Since the early 1990s undocumented migration flows from Africa to Europe has 
been on the rise. For several years the sea passage from Senegal to the Canary 
Islands, in often fragile and overcrowded boats, has had an important function in 
the West African undocumented migrant stream towards Europe. This route 
received a lot of media and political attention, which was for a large part due to 
its high risk character, with an estimated one-in-five deaths. In migration 
literature, decisions to move elsewhere are commonly viewed as an automatic 
response to unfavourable economic and political conditions. However, consider-
ing the region’s relative stable political environment and diminishing economic 
opportunity in Europe, and the high risks involved on route, it appears that one 
has to move beyond understanding migration as a rational choice. This research 
explores the meso-level, by which migration decisions are considered to be 
embedded in ongoing social contacts, in an effort to explain the decision-making 
process of Senegalese boat-migrants. The study draws on life histories of un-
successful boat migrants, collected during seven months of anthropological field-
work in Dakar. Analysis of the data suggests two models of informal migration 
decision-making. African migrants that may be characterized as opportunistic are 
motivated by an individual surge for independence from the hierarchical family 
networks and social mobility that they fulfil by cultivating important social con-
tacts, i.e. with migrants abroad. Hence their actions resonate with well-estab-
lished notions of migrants as strategic investors in the social capital of their rela-
tions. In another model, young migrants are seen to conform to the ambitions of 
senior, mostly patrilineal, kinsmen to send a family member abroad. Migration in 
this conformist model is part of a strategy of families to improve their social 
status that is driven by expected remittances. Whereas the first model may be 
appreciated as being based on individual cost-benefit calculation, the second 
model raises important questions about cultural factors driving undocumented 
migration from West Africa to Europe. 
 
  
1 
Introduction 
Although the human migration is a worldwide historical phenomenon, much is 
left unexplained about the choices people make in relation to international 
migration flows. My study seeks to contribute to recent developments in mi-
gration related research in which a relational perspective has been adopted to 
better explain migration behaviour. I do this by analyzing the functioning of 
various social networks and their influence on the motivation and decision of 
individual boat-migrants from Senegal to the Canary Islands, an islands group 
that is part of Spain. This research is based on ethnographic research with un-
successful boat-migrants in several suburbs of Dakar, Senegal’s capital, which 
has been an important departure node in this informal migration flow.  
Research problem  
West-African countries have historically experienced diverse migration flows, 
both within as well as from the region. Among them, Senegal has traditionally 
been one of the most important labour exporting countries. International mi-
gration from Senegal towards Europe started during the colonial period at the end 
of the nineteenth century and became massive after Senegalese independence 
(1962) from France. As a result of the European economic boom in the 1960s, 
companies in the former colonizer states started to recruit migrants on a large 
scale. Almost two decades followed with free movement for Senegalese to 
France. However, as a result of the economic slow-down and the downsizing of 
European enterprises, immigration in France was formally suspended on July 5, 
1974 (MFAS 2006: 2-3; Massey et al. 2005: 5; Riccio 2001a: 5; Adepoju 2005: 
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1). With a focus in France on return migration in the 1990s and a further tighten-
ing of the borders, new types of South – North migration developed, whereby the 
destination of Senegalese migrants shifted from France to Southern Europe, most 
notably Italy, Spain and Portugal (de Haas 2007: 33). The formation of the 
European Union together with a fear of a massive influx of unskilled immigrants 
and stagnating employment opportunities in the North has resulted in disadvan-
tageous migration policies for these types of migrants from Africa, while at the 
same time policies became more favourable for high-skilled migrants. Conse-
quently, since the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s it became ex-
tremely difficult to enter a European member state or settle for a longer period of 
time in a legal manner if one was not a high-skilled migrant, a dependent migrant 
family member, or applied for asylum on the basis of humanitarian grounds.  
Until today, the most common means of entering a European country for those 
who do not fit into any of these categories is to enter a European country on a 
three month valid travel document, only to later overstay the visa and disappear 
in informality. In Senegal (and probably in other West-African countries as well) 
there are accounts of lucrative informal markets where visas for European coun-
tries are sold by so-called businessman for extremely high prices.1 However, as 
many West Africans are not able (or willing) to pay these large amounts of 
money, the demand for less expensive migration routes has increased over the 
last decades.  
Sea-crossings from the West African coast towards Europe started some two 
decades with the crossing of the Street of Gibraltar from Morocco in order to 
reach Spain, a journey of only 12 kilometres, with migrants coming over land 
from several Central, West and North African countries.2 The amount of mi-
grants trying to enter Europe via this route varied per year, with 6,519 arrested 
migrants in 1999 until 16,167 in the peak year of 2001. These figures obscure the 
perilous nature of this migration flow as an estimated 10,000 died on route 
between 1989 and 2003 (Dutch Embassy Dakar 2005: 18; Simon 2006: 41). This 
route lost most of its popularity when an early warning radar system was in-
stalled. A second important informal route led from Morocco to Ceuta and Me-
lilla, two Spanish enclaves in Northern Africa. In 2005 the number of attempts to 
make it into the enclaves declined from 55,000 in 2004 to less than 12,000, 
mostly as a result of the deadly fences that were erected by authorities to prevent 
further entries (UNODC 2006: 8). In 2005 the Dutch Embassy in Dakar (2005: 
34) reported on a new informal migration route: the sea-crossing from Mauritania 
                                                            
1  The price mainly depends on the country of destination, for example, a visa for Turkey is sold for 
€1,000, while a travel document for Portugal can be bought for around €5,000, while average wages 
of my informants were around €80 a month (interviews Senegal, 2007). 
2  For an overview of undocumented migration routes beyond those that depart from the West African 
coast, see de Haas (2005) and Adepoju (2006).  
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and Northern Senegal (mainly Saint Louis) to the Canary Islands by groups of 
migrants in small and fragile boats in an attempt to reach Europe. Although the 
Canary Islands form an autonomous community, they fall under the Spanish 
central government. This meant that those migrants who entered the island group, 
and for whom the authorities were unable to trace the nationality within 40 days, 
were moved to mainland Spain where they would live at least part of their life in 
informality. 
In the peak-year of 2006 32,000 migrants arrived on one of the seven islands.3 
This migration route has received a lot of press coverage from European media, 
which reported on weakened migrants arriving on the sandy beaches of the 
touristic Canary Islands. This media attention cannot be explained by the amount 
of persons that made use of this route; compared to the total European Union 
immigration stocks of 2.6 million in 2004, 32,000 is almost negligible (UNODC 
2006: 7; de Haas 2008: 42-43; Ryan 2008: 2).4 Instead, this informal migration 
flow made group entries of African immigrants in Europe visible and due to its 
large death ratio raised important questions on the effects of European migration 
policies on the human rights and security of the individual migrant. 
The sea-passage from Dakar (Senegal) to the Canary Islands, a distance of 938 
miles (see Figure 1), takes five to seven days in the boats that are used for the 
transport of migrants (timeanddate.com, n.d.), although more recently the point 
of departure has shifted further south, where nowadays boats are leaving from as 
far as the Casamance, the southern region of Senegal, and Guinea-Bissau (Ade-
poju 2005: 2; UNHCR 2008). The sea-passage has caused many deaths due to 
starvation, drowning, and thirst, with a total estimated death toll of 5,000 in 2006 
(Magoni et al. 2007: 21; Migration News 2006).5 Not surprisingly then, most 
migrants return from their trips with nightmare-like stories. To give just one of 
the many examples I was told by one of my informants about his on-route ex-
perience: 
‘We were on open sea for eight days. The fourth day water started to enter the boat. 
At that time food and water was also finished (…) the fifth day we encountered a big 
European ship that was fishing for tuna. They gave us bread and milk and a little bit 
of water, but they refused to take us with them. We asked them the way for Nou-
adhibou (Mauritania), but they didn’t want to tell us (…) When we continued our trip 
some people fell overboard and died. The conditions were hard and we really wanted 
to reach land as quickly as possible as everybody was afraid to die.’ 
                                                            
3  A year later the number of arrivals declined to 18,000 (UNHCR 2008). 
4  The exact number of informal migrants is unknown as most statistics are mainly based on published 
police estimates that base their numbers on deportations and regularizations. Consequently, migrants 
that have never been into contact with government officials are not incorporated in the statistics. 
5  A German newspaper reported of 1167 officially registered deaths. However, other sources estimated 
that 7,000 was a more realistic figure (Der Standard, January 16, 2007). 
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Figure 1 Sea-route from Dakar to the Canary Islands  
 (source: Polfliet 2007)  
 
 
In the end fear became reality when close to land the boat sank and 65 people 
died from drowning. 
In the past, African migration flows towards Europe were mainly explained by 
macro-economic forces, whereby wage gaps and a lack of economic growth 
prospects in the home country were considered to be the main motivating factors 
for migration behaviour, a perspective that is also at the base of contemporary 
migration related policies (see for example Hatton & Williamson 2003). For 
example, European policy makers have adopted the idea that development aid 
will prevent African emigration towards Europe, with the rational that growing 
development in the country of origin takes away the economic incentive, which 
is considered to be the most important factor for these labour migrants (Wereld in 
Woorden 2006: 13). Furthermore, in a report from the Senegalese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFAS 2006) it was mentioned that economic factors, in ad-
dition to demographic ones, were considered to be the most push factors for 
people to make use of the sea-route towards the Canary Islands. However, when 
considering the high risks – besides physical also financial, psychological and 
social risks – the motivation and decisions of migrants to take part in this type of 
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informal migration need to be problematized. This asks for an exploration of the 
dynamics of informal migration decision-making processes that goes beyond 
pure economic explanation (Massey et al. 2005: 14). 
Research questions 
In the last decades migration related research has yielded several important new 
perspectives whereby migration behaviour is considered to be part of its social 
context. First of all, there is growing recognition on the influence of transnational 
ties that migrants maintain with their country of origin on subsequent migration 
flows. Second, there has been a shift in attention from the individual migrant as 
the decision-making unit towards the household, which has resulted in the in-
corporation of a relational perspective on the explanation of migration behaviour. 
My research incorporates these more relational approaches and asks whether 
risky informal migration flows can better be explained by analyzing migration 
behaviour in the social context of the migrant. This is done by a study of the 
recent risky informal migration route from Dakar (Senegal) to the Canary Is-
lands, which is most often used by Senegalese, which has resulted in the follow-
ing basic research question: What are the social and culturally related factors that 
shape the motivation and decision of undocumented migrants in urban Senegal to 
emigrate via risky sea-routes from Senegal via the Canary Islands to Europe? The 
more specific question derived from this is: How are the motivations and de-
cisions among Senegalese to make use of the sea-route from Senegal to the 
Canary Islands influenced by networks of social contacts, both at home and over-
seas?  
This question is differentiated into three sub-questions: 
1) How is undocumented boat-migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands 
socially organized? 
2) How do social networks, both at home and overseas, function? Subse-
quently, how do migrants themselves behave in the social structures and 
give meaning to them? 
3) How do social networks, materially as well as immaterially, affect the dif-
ferent steps in the migration decision-making process? 
The aim of this study being to identify specific factors that shape the motiva-
tions and decisions of informal migrants to take part in the risky sea-journey 
from Senegal to the Canary Islands, I took a (social) relational perspective on 
migration behaviour. Nevertheless, the focus is on the individual migrant, who is 
appreciated as an active agent, instead of depicting him as a passive player in the 
social structure that surrounds him.  
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Relevance 
There are several reasons why informal boat-migration from Senegal to the 
Canary Islands is an interesting topic of research. First of all, the recent shift in 
focus from macro-economic to social explanatory factors of African international 
migration behaviour can produce some important insights in understanding his-
torical as well as more recent migration flows (see also Andersson 2006: 378). 
By studying informal migration from a relational perspective I attempt to con-
tribute to these developments by better understanding the impact of social rela-
tionships, including its associated cultural elements, on the migration decision-
making process. In this way I want to go beyond reductionist economic cost-
benefit models. Furthermore, with this study I want to contribute to empirical 
data on informal migration from West Africa to Europe, as many questions 
remain. Most research on the topic has focused on migration routes, estimations 
of migration flows and the organizational networks, often in relation to finding 
solutions for informal migration, while questions on the nature of (informal) 
migration flows are left unanswered (de Haas 2008: 47). By concentrating on the 
experiences and motives of the migrants themselves this research attempts to 
contribute to a better understanding of informal migration behaviour. 
The study of Senegalese boat-migration flow towards the Canary Islands is of 
special interest as this is one of the most important modern day informal mi-
gration streams from West Africa to Europe. Because the focus is on the moti-
vation and decisions of informal migrants, as well as on the organization of the 
migration flow, it has been of importance to be as close as possible at the source. 
Therefore, research has been conducted in Dakar, which enabled the collection of 
data from individual unsuccessful boat-migrants, meaning those who left the 
Senegalese shore by boat but who were not able to reach mainland Spain, as well 
as their family members. Although informal migration routes are subject to con-
tinuous change, understanding more about the motivations and decisions may 
contribute to a better understanding of successive migration flows.  
Thesis outline  
The thesis is divided into several parts. In the first chapter migration related ex-
planatory models are outlined, whereby it is argued that economic micro and 
macro-level approaches alone cannot fully explain informal migration flows. In 
effect, a relational perspective on individual action will be introduced in which 
the need for the incorporation of social factors in the analysis of migration 
behaviour is suggested in order to come to a better understanding of migration 
behaviour. Chapter 2 zooms in on methodological choices that were made before 
and during the course of fieldwork as well as on several methodological prob-
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lems that were encountered. By focusing on the economic and political situation 
in Senegal in ‘Regional background and policy initiatives’ (Chapter 3) Sene-
galese boat-migrants are placed in their geographical and political context and it 
is argued that economic and political factors alone cannot fully explain this 
informal migration flow. In addition, different policy initiatives are discussed. 
‘Organization and practices of informal migration’ (Chapter 4) outlines the 
organizational part of informal boat-migration from Dakar. In addition, two 
varying case studies of unsuccessful boat-migrants are presented with a focus on 
their social context. In ‘The decision making process in socio-cultural context’ 
(Chapter 5), the process of informal decision-making is analyzed with reference 
to the case studies. In this chapter the focus is on the role played by different 
social networks in varying steps of the migration decision-making process. In the 
final chapter, the existing theoretical models are revisited with reference to the 
data from this study. The concluding argument holds that there is a need for more 
refined and sophisticated migration models, which leave more space for the in-
dividual migrant as an active agent.  
 
  
2 
Individual migration behaviour  
socially embedded 
Migration does not occur in a vacuum. People do not migrate because they must. We 
are not animals that have some deep-seated need to complete a circuit in response to 
some biological drive. Rather, humans migrate because they can. People make de-
cisions to migrate in response to desires, lifestyles, resources, and needs. (Cohen 
2004: 19) 
In the early days of migration research, rational choice theory was most in-
fluential in trying to explain international migration behaviour. From this per-
spective it is argued that the migrant acts as a rational economic calculating agent 
independent of his/her social context. Another influential perspective comes from 
the so-called structuralists, who argue that global processes and country relations 
shape migration outcomes. In response to these under- and over-socialized expla-
natory models, a relational perspective was developed, which placed individual 
behaviour in its social context in order to better explain differential migration 
behaviour. After having outlined the concept of undocumented migration, I will 
zoom in on several theoretical approaches in the migration literature. 
Conceptualizing international undocumented migration  
International migration concerns the movement of persons across international 
borders with the intention to settle in another country for a period of at least one 
year (Muus 2001: 32). People can have varying motives for this action; migrants 
can be driven by a survival motive, an improvement motive or a combination of 
the two. The main difference lies in the ability to choose, whereby the first group 
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is forced to migrate, while the second group has a free choice to do so (van Wijk 
2007: 25-26). Besides motives a further categorization is derived from the means 
to move across international borders with or without a legal travel document. 
This research focuses on undocumented migrants. The term in general refers to 
those persons who enter or remain in a country of which they are not citizen and 
for which they do not possess valid documents according to national laws. This 
then includes those who enter a country without valid travel documents, like 
those in the present study, but can also include migrants who stay in the host 
country after their valid travel documents have expired, as well as rejected 
asylum seekers (GCIM 2005: 32; Içduygu & Unalan 2001: 3). The majority of 
migrants who want to enter a country without valid travel documents have to rely 
on on-route assistance from informal facilitating networks during at least part of 
the journey.  
The term ‘undocumented migration’ is not generally used. Instead, different 
appellations for this type of migration are circulating, which makes for varying 
connotations. For example, European policy makers usually seem to prefer the 
term ‘illegal immigrants’ to denote migrants who enter or stay in the country 
without legal papers in order to legitimize measures taken to tackle this kind of 
immigration by prevention or deportation after apprehension. Although in the 
legal-technical sense they may be right, in this thesis I prefer to use the term 
‘undocumented migrants’ to stay away from the judicial field. 
The micro- and macro-level 
Migration as an economic rational choice outcome 
The idea that improvement migrants move as a result of well-considered eco-
nomic cost-benefit calculations has for a long time prevailed in the development 
of theoretical models that tried to explain international migration flows. This 
perspective suggests that future migrants mainly respond to economic differences 
between the country of origin and the country of destination as individual rati-
onal agents and is ‘based on several universal axioms such as the maximization 
of preferences of utility and the principle of strategic intentionality’ (Long 2001: 
15, who criticizes this approach). This classic economic push-pull framework 
was first postulated by Ravenstein in his work The Laws of Migration (1889), 
which’ reasoning later studies have largely followed. For example, in the neo-
classical model it is proposed that migration is a consequence of calculated 
differences in the supply and demand for labour and a way of establishing equi-
librium between the country of origin, where there is a high supply of labour, and 
the receiving country, where there is a high demand of (low skilled) labour 
(Massey et al. 2005: 8). It is assumed that emigration will occur when expected 
results show a positive net return, which are mainly based on income differentials 
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in the home country and the country of destination. This also means that in the 
long run international migration will disappear when labour wage differentials 
are absent (van Wijk 2007: 27). 
Even though economic disparities are important predictors for migration 
flows, they cannot by themselves explain why labour migration occurs, and more 
important, why it does not occur everywhere. After all, a large proportion of the 
impoverished population stays at home (Cohen 2004: 4). Furthermore, migrants 
are not homogenous and different countries (and regions within countries) with a 
similar level of economic development show different levels of migration. More-
over, most international economic migrants do not come from the poorest coun-
tries in the world (Massey et al. 2005: 10, 18). Especially for risky migration 
routes, there has to be more at stake than pure rational economic cost-benefit 
calculations. This asks for the inclusion of secondary factors that are neglected in 
these economic models, which would also open up the possibility for the pre-
diction of the origin and changes of migration flows (see also van Wijk 2007: 
27). 
 
Structural models 
Besides rational choice models, a theoretical approach can be found that attempts 
at explaining international migration flows by mainly focusing on historical 
macro-level processes. One of the most influential has been the push-pull theory, 
which assumes that bad social, political and/or economic environments in the 
home country (the push factors) motivate people to migrate. At the same time 
they are attracted by prospective positive elements in another place, i.e. high 
incomes, a safe living environment and a stable political climate (the pull factors) 
(van Wijk 2007: 26-27; Massey et al. 2005: 13-14). This approach draws mainly 
from the dependency and world systems theory, which suggests that global ex-
pansion of the capitalist system led to international migration flows (Massey et 
al. 2005: 34-36). Another model that emphasizes the importance of structural 
factors is the migration systems approach, which focuses on the role of histo-
rical, economic and political relations between countries (van Wijk 2007: 31). 
One of the consequences of this structural thinking was a shift of the unit of 
analysis from the individual migrant to the global market and to political and 
economic policies (Brettell 2000: 103). 
Although this structural perspective has some explanatory value on the macro 
level, it cannot fully explain international migration flows. Where micro-eco-
nomic explanatory models fall short in integrating structural factors in the ana-
lysis, this macro-level model portrays migrants as passive agents, who blindly 
react to world capitalist systems. In this way the structural approach does not 
provide insights into the experience and motivation of the individual migrant. In 
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addition, these models do not leave much room for the explanation of migration 
selectivity. In other words, why do some people migrate, while others do not 
(van Wijk 2007: 33; Brettell 2000: 103)? 
An actor-oriented perspective on migration action 
Individual action socially embedded  
A general weakness of the above-mentioned models is exactly their negligence of 
each other’s’ reasoning. In the rational choice perspective the focus is too much 
on the individual, while structuralism underestimates the individual power to act. 
From the 1970s onwards, Giddens has voiced criticism on these micro- and 
macro-level models of thinking and developed in response the structuration 
theory. Stones (2005: 14), revising this theory two decades later, argued that 
according to Giddens, 
[S]ubjectivism uproots agents from their socio-cultural context, treating them as de-
racinated, free-floating individuals, whereas objectivism treats them so derisively 
that they sink without trace, conceptualized as if they lack the autonomy to cause 
even the slightest ripple of disturbance on a social surface determined wholly by 
powerful and impersonal systemic tide. 
The structuration theory basically implied that there is a dialectical relation 
between individual action (agency) and social relations (structure), whereby 
agency should be understood as people’s ability to do something. This action 
draws upon their knowledge of the structural context and is guided by power 
relations, meanings and norms. In this sense they are dependent on the system. 
However, at the same time, their actions, with their unintended outcomes, also 
reproduce structure (Giddens 1984: 3-19; 1979: 55).1 Structure than refers to 
rules, which constrain the agent in his/her power to act, but also enables the act 
of those who possess more power. In this theory of structuration, Giddens (1984: 
178) considers human beings to be knowledgeable rational agents who act 
within an enabling and constraining structural context. In effect, social forces, 
when taking into account the motives and goals that underlie specific questions, 
sometimes can make a person unable to resist these forces. On the other hand, 
structure provides resources, whereby human beings are enabled to experience a 
relative sense of freedom as it gives them the ability to affect change. Yet, this 
depends on the time-space dissociation: ‘the greater the institutions bite into time 
and space – the more resistant they are to manipulation or change by any in-
dividual agent’ (Ibid.: 171). Power is thus an essential element of structure and 
refers to a person’s ability to act otherwise, which means that a person over 
whom power is wielded could have acted otherwise had this power not been 
                                                            
1  Giddens (1984: 19) has called this the duality of structure. 
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exercised, thereby giving all human beings a certain relative autonomy (Lukes 
1977: 6-7). 
Granovetters’ (1985) model of ‘social embeddedness’ can be linked to Gid-
dens’ theory of structuration. The central idea is that all human action is pur-
posive and embedded in ongoing systems of social relations (Ibid.: 487). Rather 
than viewing social structures as external of human beings, theorists like Giddens 
and Granovetter argue for the existence of a mutual dependency of structure and 
agency, whereby people for a great part understand their surroundings and the 
circumstances of their action (Giddens 1979: 71). As human beings are rational 
agents they calculate the risks of the outcome of their future act in respect to the 
likelihood of the sanctions they might face. In addition, they may be prepared to 
submit to them as a price to be paid for achieving a particular end (Lukes 1977: 
87). This means that by incorporating social factors in the analysis of human 
action, i.e., power, status, expectations etc., in addition to economic motivations, 
behaviour that might seem irrational can in fact be very sensible.  
This line of thinking on human action has had its impact on the study of 
migration. As the preceding micro- and macro-level theories failed to explain the 
origin and changes in migration flows, researchers in the field of (undocumented) 
migration started to incorporate the structure-agency paradigm in their analysis, 
which led to a shift on the relative importance of non-economic over economic 
factors. In this process two influential models were developed: The social net-
work theory and the collective action model. 
 
Social network theory 
The first model that derived from the social actor-oriented perspective mainly 
focuses on a person’s membership in migrant networks. These networks are con-
sidered to be a set of ties between the former migrant, non-migrants and migrants 
in the country of origin and destination, based on shared characteristics. This is 
integrated in the social network theory2 whereby it is assumed that social net-
works are the binding factor between relational decisions and structural forces 
that influence international migration as they lower the (expected) risks and costs 
of movement, while at the same time the expected net outcomes increase. The 
presence of these networks can lead to a process of chain migration,3 whereby 
every new migrant creates social capital that is assists in reducing the risk of 
movement for future migrants. In this way, the odds of migration increase and 
eventually make it virtually risk free to move (Massey et al. 2005: 42-43, 56; 
Staring 2001: 9-10). 
                                                            
2  The theory is not restricted to the field of migration, but has been of importance in many fields of 
social research. 
3  This is also called cumulative causation. 
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Most attention in migration related literature has been paid to networks based 
on shared ethnic origins. These networks of solidarity are said to provide new 
social connections and employment in the country of destination for new mi-
grants, by which they are less prone to exploitation. At the same time, informa-
tion on opportunities, transportation and initial accommodation in the receiving 
country is provided (Choldin 1973: 164; Winters et al. 2001: 29-30).4 This has 
led to the argument that future migrants are more prone to migrate to countries 
where they are able to make use of these networks (Choldin 1973; Padilla 2006). 
Moreover, it is suggested that migrants’ dependency on transnational networks 
increases with the risks attached to migration (Staring 2001: 3; Massey et al. 
2001: 1275). 
 
Social capital 
The suggestion that migrants can make use of the resources of their migrant 
networks before and after migration, as well as en route stems from a social 
capital approach. In this model it is argued that a person is able to make access 
claims on scarce resources by virtue of membership in social networks or other 
social structures (Portes 1998: 6). Here we can find two lines of thinking on the 
maintenance of social ties and the functioning of access claims. Instrumentalists 
like Coleman, Portes and Putman consider access to resources to be a strategic 
investment in which reciprocity of the contacts is of central importance. This 
means that people can make access claims by deliberately investing in cultural 
and economic resources by which they maintain social relations (Ibid.: 4). Bour-
dieu voiced criticism against this instrumentalist approach and argued that social 
capital is the whole of resources that result from membership in a group with a 
common name (family, lineage etc.). He further suggested that the volume of 
social capital is based on the network of the ego he/she can effectively mobilize, 
as well as on the amount of capital his/her network members possess. In addition, 
Bourdieu reasoned that people do not always deliberately maintain social rela-
tions for future benefits, while access claims also depend on the position and type 
of network of the person who makes these claims (Pels 1989: 132-133, 18). 
In the social network model on migration behaviour the instrumentalist per-
spective on social capital dominates, as it assumes that future migrants are able to 
make access claims on the resources of their migrant contacts, which is the result 
of deliberate investment in these relationships by the non-migrant for future 
benefits (Staring 2001: 12). Two types of resources that can be derived from mi-
gratory networks and which can influence migration decision-making processes 
                                                            
4  In the 1980s this was called the information hypothesis, meaning that strong networks encourage and 
direct migration behaviour by making potential migrants aware of job and housing conditions (Hugo 
1981: 200). 
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are discussed in the migration literature. On one hand direct assistance can re-
duce the costs of migration by provided money, housing, food, and transportation 
(Engbersen 2004: 31). On the other hand migrant networks can provide inform-
ation to ‘update their subjective distribution of returns from migration’ (Winters 
et al. 2001: 161). 
As this model on social capital accumulation mainly focuses on the equal dis-
tribution of scarce resources, several questions about the functioning of social 
networks and migration decision-making remain. For example, it can be ques-
tioned whether migrant networks always provide support for future migrants. As 
the focus has mainly been on the positive effects of social capital, negative 
elements of ‘competition’ and ‘exclusion’ are largely ignored, although they can 
be of great importance in understanding the functioning of social networks (Long 
2001: 133; Hardwick 2003: 164; Portes 1998: 15).5 
 
Strong and weak ties 
Social capital can come from various transnational networks, based on different 
common identifying elements, i.e. kinship, community, ethnicity, religious affi-
liation etc. In migration related literature most attention is paid to the role of 
ethnic and family networks. Kinship relations in this field mainly refer to nuclear 
and extended family members and are therefore categorized as strong ties, char-
acterized by long-lasting contacts, emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocity. 
Close friends are also spoken of as strong ties due to their similar relationship 
characteristics. Although it is suggested that strong ties are the most important 
source for reciprocal support, the high levels of trust which are inherent in these 
relations is also their weakness as it might isolate people from outside informa-
tion and support (Staring 2001: 14-15). Weak ties include friendship relations, 
colleagues and acquaintances and are often excluded from migration-related 
studies as they are assumed to have only a minor influence on future migration 
action (van Wijk 2007: 28; Boyd 1989: 649). Nevertheless, Massey et al. (2001: 
1295) have argued that networks based on kinship do not necessarily have to be 
the most salient in shaping migration behaviour. Instead, they suggest that friend-
ship and acquaintance networks may be equally or better predictors of migration. 
Wilson (1998: 401), in a study on Mexican immigrants in the U.S., found em-
pirical data on the varying functions of strong and weak networks and suggested 
that strong ties provided more social capital in the form of direct assistance from 
the migrants to their community members, while new information came from 
weak contacts. Granovetter (1973) already mentioned this ‘strength of weak ties’ 
in the 1970s, with the argument that these ties have the character and ability of 
                                                            
5  Engbersen et al. (2000: 3) found for example that undocumented migrants in the Netherlands were 
excluded from migrant networks as they could not reciprocate support due to their status. 
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connecting different networks (local bridges). These findings suggest that differ-
ent networks provide varying types of social capital. 
With respect to information distribution a distinction is made between latent 
and direct information. The first comes from the observation (non-contact) of 
migrants and results in common knowledge about migration (the folk-wisdom). It 
is suggested that the value of this kind of information depends on whether a 
message is fully expressed and on its source. Direct information in contrast, is 
transmitted through contact with the source. Media can also be a source of in-
formation on migration, but with the argumentation that this information is 
equally distributed among (urban) households, it is not expected to explain a 
differential outcome in informal migration action (Winters et al. 2001: 161-162). 
In addition to family and friendship contacts, previous research found that two 
other networks can influence migration behaviour, those related to the organiza-
tion of the trip and religious networks. 
 
Smuggling networks  
Those who want to reach the Canary Islands from Senegal generally need some 
kind of assistance, which is either provided by social networks of the potential 
migrant or by more organized networks. In migration literature the latter is 
referred to as either human smuggling or human trafficking networks. The last 
implies that ‘migration is not entirely voluntary and the intent invariably ex-
ploitative’ (UNODC 2006: 1). Instead, human smuggling, which is a relatively 
new concept in the (international) jurisdiction and social sciences, refers to the 
assistance of person X by person Y during at least part of the migration journey 
(van Wijk 2007: 49). Although this assistance arises from profit seeking for 
which high amounts of money are asked, it is based on mutual consent and ad-
vantages and therefore it does not necessarily involve exploitation (Içduygu & 
Toktas 2002: 29; GCIM 2005: 39). 
Not much is known about the relationship between organizers and clients on 
different undocumented migration routes, besides that they are short lasting, 
unique, formal and distant (Staring 2001: 16). In several studies a relation was 
found between the motivation to migrate and the organizational network, for 
example as a result of the false or too optimistic picture of Europe human 
smugglers give in order to recruit clients (see Schloenhardt 2003: 18; Chin 1999: 
26). Nonetheless, studies on the influence of organizational networks on mi-
gration behaviour are scarce. 
 
Religious communities 
Previous studies have indicated the influential role of religious communities and 
their leaders on formal migration behaviour in Senegal (see for example, Scha-
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pendonk & van Moppes 2007c; Riccio 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2005). These lea-
ders, who also possess great political power, are called marabouts. Their in-
fluence has especially been proven to be of importance among members of the 
Mouride (Mouridiyya) brotherhood, which brings forth the largest group of trans-
migrants.6 These migrants move back and forth between Senegal and, in the 
majority of cases, Italy to practice trade. The role of these religious networks 
mainly stems from the presence of a large transnational network and social 
capital they provide for their members (i.e., support in establishing businesses, 
and mobility and temporary settlement in the country of destination). Moreover, 
in these religious networks emigration is considered to be part of a training 
experience. However, this form of circulatory migration is only provided for the 
members of the Mouride brotherhood and is directed to migration with legal 
documents (Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007c; Riccio 2000). It therefore needs 
to be explored if there is a relationship between these religious networks and 
undocumented migration. 
In the present study the content and strength of different types of social net-
works will be analyzed in order to better understand how different types of 
relations influence informal migration motivation and decisions. With respect to 
content it will be asked what the positive and negative effects of embeddedness 
in migrant networks are on boat-migration behaviour of Senegalese men, where-
by it is of importance to understand the significance and nature of the resources 
that can be mobilized from different sets of social relations as well as how these 
social ties are maintained. In addition to the significance of the different roles of 
migrant networks in undocumented migration decision-making processes, the 
relationships vis-à-vis religious groups and smugglers will be incorporated in the 
analysis. 
 
Collective decision-making 
Social network models overwhelmingly focus on how migrant networks abroad 
affect migration outcomes and as a result ignore the role of social relations in the 
country of origin. Since the 1970s, the new economics of migration approach has 
made attempts to incorporate the home country relationships in explaining mi-
gration behaviour, by shifting the unit of analysis from the individual to the 
household (Grasmuck & Pessar 1991: 15). Although economic cost-benefit cal-
culations are still at the base of this model, it dissociates itself from the idea that 
migration behaviour is a purely individual process. Instead it is argued that the 
decision to migrate is part of a larger unit than the individual, in most cases the 
household. In these larger units migration behaviour is collectively motivated in 
                                                            
6  In Senegal the majority of Muslims is part of a religious brotherhood, the three others being 
Tidianyya, Quadryya and Layenne (Riccio 2000: 3). 
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order to minimize economic risks and maximize wage-earnings on the household 
level (Massey et al. 2005: 21; Curran & Saguy 2001: 60). ‘The household’ can 
therefore be defined as ‘(…) those who live together, but also those who are 
residing elsewhere and whose principal commitments and obligations are to that 
household, and who are expected to return to that household in the future’ 
(Içduygu & Unalan 2001: 12). Hence, migration is in this model regarded as a 
(transnational) household strategy, whereby migrants overseas retain linkages 
with the ones in the country of origin for the benefit of the household (Schoorl et 
al. 2001: 4; Boyd 1989: 643; MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000: 134).  
 
Networks of obligations 
It is suggested that members of a household act according to networks of obli-
gations. This refers to the expectations people have of each other as a result of 
the social position they occupy, expressed in ‘common sense’ meanings (Mit-
chell 1973: 13). This in turn relates to norms and beliefs that are associated with 
these perceptions of which the actors themselves are knowledgeable (Giddens 
1984). The expectations, norms and obligations are differently divided among 
members based on ones position in the household that depends on age, sex, and 
kin relation (Harbison 1981: 241). In the new economics of migration model it is 
assumed that these relationships of obligation enable household members to 
select and encourage another household member to migrate with the expectation 
that remittances will be distributed among the remaining household members. In 
effect, it is the household as a larger unit that mobilizes the resources and support 
for the trip (Grasmuck & Pessar 1991: 15; Boyd 1989: 645-646).7 In a recent 
study on international migration from Cameroon to Germany, Fleischer (2006) 
emphasized that the extended family and kin networks have a major influence on 
migration behaviour as a result of the extended family’s expectations, obligations 
and responsibilities on its members. Her data showed that authority figures in the 
household and extended family, i.e. parents, cousins etc. are the most important 
decision-makers when it comes to migration, influenced by their expectations of 
modernity and ‘the prospects of consuming imported foreign goods’ (Ibid.: 11). 
This suggests that larger units than the individual migrants do not decide to send 
a person abroad out of a means to minimize risks, but rather to achieve social 
upward mobility. This is often related to the process of relative deprivation, 
meaning that the desire for an increase in income is not (only) caused by ‘real’ 
poverty, but by a comparison to the income of other wealthier (migrant) house-
holds, a so-called ‘relative’ poverty (Massey et al. 2005: 26). In addition, the 
authoritarian decision-makers in Fleischer’s study were the ones who held access 
                                                            
7  This also explains why migration as a household strategy does not occur at all times, for example in 
families for whom the economic costs are too high (Boyd 1989: 645-646).  
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to information about the journey and the country of destination and created net-
works for the future migrant to make the move to Germany possible (Fleischer 
2006: 26). In this sense her study confirms the idea that the basic unit of 
decision-making is a larger unit, in this case the extended family, rather than the 
individual migrant him/herself (see also Grasmuck & Pessar 1991: 15). 
In the present study the role of other household members on the decision to 
participate in the risky sea-migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands will be 
analyzed. In order to better understand their influencing role, I will zoom in on 
the functioning of family relationships and the related networks of obligations. 
Moreover, the adoption of an actor-oriented perspective will enable me to under-
stand how individuals act within these networks of norms and power relations, as 
persons ‘(…) do not simply respond to the imperatives of cultural norms and 
values, or to the dictates of dominant discourses’ (Long 2001: 4). In other words, 
relationship structures of obligations and expectations do not automatically lead 
to certain action, but, dependent on the constraints and enabling factors inherent 
in specific social structures, individuals have some leeway to act and negotiate 
their position vis-à-vis other contacts. In addition, this study takes the organiza-
tion of the sea-journey into account in order to indicate from which networks 
information and direct assistance (i.e., finances) are derived that enable boat-
migration. 
Risk 
The abovementioned theoretical models have been mainly applied to formal 
migration behaviour. One important aspect that in most cases distinguishes 
undocumented migration from documented migration, and which characterizes 
the boat-migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands, is the element of risk 
involved in the move. Besides expected financial, social and psychological 
dangers, a more humane risk attached to this type of migration is the chance to 
lose one’s life during the trip. 
Considering that human security is of primary concern to every person and 
that human being are rational actors, who are aware (to a certain extent) of their 
decisions and related perceived costs and benefits of future outcomes, questions 
can be raised on the motivation to participate in the high-risk boat-migration. As 
Massey et al. (2005: 13-14) argued, an improvement in the economic situation 
alone cannot completely explain the decision and motivation in the case of risky 
migration. Instead, people who migrate without documents need a very strong 
motive. However, there is a lack of scholarly attention for the way undocumented 
migrants conceptualize risk, and assess and understand risk-taking (Hernández-
Carretero 2008: 1; Lupton 2006: 21).  
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In the social sciences, risk is often conceptualized as the action that can have 
possible positive or negative results and assessed in relation to human experi-
ence, by asking questions on how risk is perceived and understood. Aven & Renn 
(2009) suggest that risk assessment is based on two dimensions, uncertainty and 
severity, which applies to behaviour or an event as well as to its outcomes. In 
effect, personal and social characteristics influence how a person experiences the 
uncertainty and severity of the event and its consequences. This therefore means 
that risk is inherently related to the person who perceives it and his/her environ-
ment. This then means that in order to understand a person’s perception of risk 
we have to focus not only on the individual assessment but also on the way the 
experience of risk is socially embedded.  
The inclusion of the factor of risk might mean that an adjustment has to be 
made to the new economics of migration model. For example, it is suggested that 
in migration flows in which there is a high risk, households are less likely to send 
migrants abroad as they aim at maximizing returns of migration (Winters et al. 
2001: 163). However, a recent study on informal migration from Senegal to the 
Canary Islands indicated that the majority of the parents of the informal boat-
migrants supported the activities of their children (Mbow & Penda 2006: 49). In 
the present study it will be explored how Senegalese boat-migrants as well as 
their family members assess and perceive different types of risk-taking that are 
inherent in the boat-migration. Specifically it asks questions on how these mi-
grants deal with possible negative physical outcomes of the trip and how this 
relates to their motivation and decision-making process to participate in the boat-
migration. 
The research focus  
The over- and under-socialization of the micro- and macro-level models cannot 
on their own explain migration flows (and changes therein). Different authors 
like Giddens and Granovetter have provided renewed perspectives on behaviour, 
which has been a starting point for several more recent actor-oriented models in 
migration related literature. They have suggested that individual behaviour is 
embedded in a system of rules and resources, governed by power relations, 
which can both constrain and enable intended behaviour of individuals. In other 
words, their focus is on the strength of social forces on individual action. Two 
models that followed from this line of thinking in migration related research; the 
social network theory and the theory of new economics of migration that both 
focus on the embeddedness of migration behaviour in social relationships. The 
first mainly looks at the role of migrant networks, while in the second it is 
suggested that the household should be the unit of analysis. 
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It is expected that this actor-oriented approach can provide important insights 
for the study on undocumented migration. First of all, it will help to explain how 
the undocumented migration flow from Senegal to the Canary Islands is or-
ganized. Second, it will be explored how the act of undocumented migration is 
embedded in different sets of social relations of the potential boat-migrant. 
Although the action of human beings is embedded in social structures, governed 
by resources and rules, actors ‘(…) are capable (even within severely restricted 
social and personal space) of processing (self-consciously or otherwise) their 
lived experiences and act upon them’ (Long 2001: 18). In other words, actors do 
not blindly follow a pre-scribed ideological script but rather find ways to monitor 
their own actions with reference to socially learned experience. Based on this 
idea, my study focuses on the experiences, perceptions and actions of the mi-
grants themselves, instead of merely describing the social structure in which they 
act. In this way I attempt to come to a better understanding of undocumented 
migration behaviour. In order to achieve this, different sets of social relationships 
and their varying influences on undocumented migration behaviour are integrated 
in the research: Kin, friendship, and acquaintance relationships in the home 
country as well as abroad, as well as facilitators of the trip.   
 
  
3 
Researching undocumented  
migration 
Migration by boat from Senegal to the Canary Islands is characterized by infor-
mality and secrecy. In an early stage of my fieldwork I discovered that quanti-
tative research tools could not provide the necessary conditions to come up with 
reliable data in this specific research context. Rather, elements of informality and 
secrecy ask for confidence and relationships of trust, which can only be estab-
lished by long lasting personal contact between the informant and the researcher. 
Ethnographic research methods, inherent in anthropological fieldwork, have 
proven to be suitable for the establishment of rapport and confidence. In what 
follows I will detail the methodological considerations of this study. I will start 
by elaborating on the field setting and the informants, after which I will proceed 
to the research design. I will end this chapter with a discussion of the method-
ological problems I encountered. 
Research location 
The primary research location for this study has been Jaraax, an area of larger 
Dakar which borders the sea. This suburb of Dakar is characterized by its high 
population density,1 its poor infrastructure and lack of waste management. The 
majority of its inhabitants identify themselves as Lébou,2 an ethnic group that for 
many years economically relied on the fishing industry (Mbow & Tamba 2006: 
                                                            
1  39,998 persons on an area of 1,297 hectares (Mbow & Tamba 2006: 41).   
2  The Lebou are one of the ethnic groups in Senegal. Other, larger ethnic groups are the Wolof (43.3%), 
Pular (23.8%), Serer (14.7%), Jola (3.7%), Mandinka (3%) and Soninke (1.1%) (CIA 2008). 
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41). This is still visible every morning on the beach where a crowd of mostly 
older women sell the daily catch to male traders and local customers. However, 
during the last decade the revenues from the fishing activity have decreased, 
which mostly has been the result of the inability of the Senegalese fishing 
industry to compete with the growing presence of large European fishing vessels 
along the North and West African coasts (U.S. Embassy Dakar 2001).3 Conse-
quently, nowadays many young men from Jaraax have shifted their activities to 
manual work, which has resulted in a growing amount of ateliers for carpenters, 
cabinet-makers and tailors in the neighbourhood.   
As Jaraax used to be a key node in the boat-migration network in 2006 (Mbow 
& Tamba 2006), it became an obvious location for further study.4 In addition, 
and not unimportant, in this neighbourhood I met some first informants to whom 
I was introduced by one of my Senegalese informants in the Netherlands. The 
availability of a network of informants proved essential as during the research 
process it turned out that finding contacts was difficult.  
Pikine and Guediawaye, also suburbs of Dakar, are the two other areas where I 
carried out fieldwork. They do not connect directly to the Atlantic Ocean and are 
located further from the city centre (see Figure 2 for research locations), and 
finding informants in these areas proved to be more difficult. Although economic 
activity is not directed to fishing in these areas, these suburbs do resemble Jaraax 
by their bad infrastructure, poverty and overpopulation.   
The informants  
The core data was collected among 16 Senegalese young men between the age of 
23 and 44 years old,5 who had at least once tried to reach the Canary Islands by 
boat in the last three years. These men either failed to reach the Canary Islands 
due to premature return or were repatriated upon arrival, and therefore I will call 
them in the rest of the thesis ‘unsuccessful boat-migrants’. As I mentioned be-
fore, finding respondents proved to be difficult. Due to the sensitive and illicit 
character of the practice of boat-migration many people did not want to talk 
about their present or past undocumented migration attempts with others. In ad-
dition, boat-migration stands high on the national and international political 
agenda with police and marine corpses being instructed to arrest those involved 
in the activity. As those in the preparatory phase also did not want to speak about 
their plans to others for mystical reasons, which I will explain later, and as I did  
 
                                                            
3  The presence of European vessels has been allowed by Senegal’s external fishing agreement with the 
European Union (U.S. Embassy Dakar 2001: 2). 
4  At the time of fieldwork the points of departure had moved further south.  
5  This was the age at the time of interviewing, with an average of 30.5 years.  
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Figure 2  Research locations 
 (source: Toubab.com 2008)  
 
 
not want to put any of my informants in danger, it turned out that speaking to 
those who were in the preparatory phase of leaving the country by boat seemed 
practically impossible. As a result, researching those who had already made the 
passage seemed a more logical and pragmatic option, which also enabled me to 
gain insight into the stages of the decision-making process of those who had 
made multiple attempts. 
Access to informants was provided by the snowball method by which the 
interviewed informant introduced me to a friend or acquaintances for future 
interviews. This had several advantages. First of all, once I had established a 
good relationship with the informant, he would tell his friends, whom I could 
interview, that I was trustworthy. This eased subsequent contact. For example, 
one of my key informants belonged to a network of informal boat-migrants and 
introduced me to many of his friends and colleagues that had, like him, tried to 
make the sea-passage. As he told his friends that I was trustworthy, I could build 
up relationships of confidence with them more easily than would have been the 
case otherwise. Especially in research among activities that lie outside the law 
and for which one has to rely on relationships of trust, ‘snowballing’ can be 
regarded as the best sampling method. Another advantage of this method was the 
possibility it provided me to cross-check information among different informants 
that belonged to the same network (see also MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 
2000: 24). 
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The majority of my informants belonged to the work and friendship networks 
of Ibrahima, among who several were, like him, working in the cleaning busi-
ness. Other labour sectors in which my informants were working included retail 
trade in cement and fish, and small commerce in addition to their regular jobs.6 
One of my informants was running his own barbershop and only one was un-
employed. Thirteen of my informants either lived or worked in Jaraax, while one 
lived in Guediawaye and two others in Pikine. Seven of the respondents were 
married and had children at the time of interviewing and time they made the 
attempt to leave for Europe by boat. The rest of the men were single or had a 
girlfriend. Besides this, most of the respondents were born in Dakar and left 
school at a young age to do practical education at the workplace or to start 
working. The majority of them was Muslim, with only two being Christians, 
which reflects the country’s religious composition. Most come from polygamous 
households and have at least four siblings. All of the informants still lived at their 
parental homes at the time of interviewing. With respect to their migration 
history it can be said that ten of the respondents tried to leave Senegal by boat 
once, four twice and two up to three times. 
In an effort not to expose my informants I decided to use pseudonyms, even 
though the chances of police arrest would not have been very likely as they are 
no more in the process of preparing for departure by boat. In addition, all of my 
informants indicated that I could use their names, as it are their stories that have 
to be told. However, especially in studies among informal activities I believe it is 
necessary for the researcher to be as careful about the identity of the informants 
as possible (MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000: 26). 
Research design 
Ethnographic research and grounded theory 
The use of ethnographic research methods was motivated by the informal nature 
of the topic and the need for confidence between the researcher and the in-
formants. Even though many people have been involved in boat-migration ac-
tivities, especially in Jaraax, it still is a topic that people do not talk about in 
public. Anthropological methods are very well suited for this kind of research 
setting, as it leaves room for building long lasting relationships of trust. I found 
out myself that the use of quantitative methods proved difficult in this study set-
ting when I conducted structured household interviews among family members 
of ‘successful’ boat-migrants, meaning those who actually had made it to Europe 
through the Canary Islands. It soon became clear that the respondents gave so-
                                                            
6  In general small commerce is not considered as a job in Senegal and in most cases not included in 
employment statistics. 
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cially desirable answers and occasionally did not want to answer certain delicate 
questions. I learned that this was the result of me not having a trustworthy 
relationship with them. Instead, the only possible way of gaining valuable insight 
into people’s decision-making processes was to spend a lot of time with them. 
Moreover, as different family members do not always share the same opinion 
about boat-migration, the researcher has to be sensitive to family relations and 
has to pay special attention to who knows what. I discovered during the many 
hours I spent with my informants and their family members, which persons knew 
what about the informal migration activity of their relative and this information 
proved to be of paramount importance in order not to damage any of the 
informants in front of their relatives. 
Quantitative research tools would have been appropriate when the aim of this 
research was to describe the social structure in which the informal migrants find 
themselves. However, I focused on social and cultural elements that shape in-
dividual migration action, in other words, how migrants behave in the social 
structure of constraints and opportunities. By making use of an actor-oriented 
approach I was able to uncover by which intentions, motives, beliefs and rules 
people were guided in their decisions. In the words of Flyvbjerg (2006: 229):  
(…) from (…) an action-oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the 
deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the 
symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur.  
Therefore, this research asked for long term and close contact with the res-
pondents in order to become familiar with the meanings in social behaviour 
(Mitchell 1973: 15). This is of special importance as the objective of this study 
has been to interpret the social processes and cultural logics that lie underneath 
the individual act to migrate by boat.  
The data is interpreted with the aim of building theory through the grounded 
theory approach, with an awareness of the existing literature before engaging in 
the fieldwork, instead of merely generating models from the collected data. This 
is for two reasons. First, the existing literature can guide the research design in 
some ways, especially when it comes to stating the research question. In this way 
the problem of being overwhelmed with data during the fieldwork can be 
avoided as existing theory brings structure to the data collection. Second, rather 
than merely repeating previous studies and wasting time on information gather-
ing that could have been found in secondary sources during the pre-fieldwork 
stage, having knowledge on existing literature makes it more likely to something 
to scientific knowledge (Pidgeon & Henwood 2004: 633; Fox 2004: 311, 313).7 
                                                            
7  Pigeon & Henwood (2004: 634) use the term theoretical agnosticism to illustrate the relationship 
between the research and the pre-existing literature. This means that the researcher should be aware of 
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In practice the grounded theory approach means a constant comparison between 
the literature, the data and the generated models, until the moment of theoretical 
saturation has been achieved, whereby more data does not add anything new to 
the developed theory (Gasson 2004; Pidgeon & Henwood 2004; Strauss & Cor-
bin 1998).  
 
Case study design 
A case study design was chosen because it enabled me to make a detailed study 
of the decision-making process and to uncover its key elements. It has also been 
useful in situating the decision-making process in its social context, as it enabled 
the identification of social norms, values and interests on which the undocu-
mented migration decision-making process and relationships are based. The use 
of case studies leaves room for subjective criteria in analyzing network mecha-
nisms, which can be of great importance. For example, a relation that scores high 
on objective criteria (for example the amount of gifts) might score low on the 
importance for the informant and therefore the tie might not be of such great 
significance as otherwise would have been concluded (Boissevain 1974: 46). 
Furthermore, by “observing” the social system and at the same time comparing 
this to the informants’ (sentimental) statements, I was able to analyze ‘the dis-
crepancy between people’s beliefs and professed acceptance of certain norms on 
the one hand and their actual behaviour on the other’ (van Velsen 1967: 143), 
which allowed me to show individual migration behaviour in relation to the 
structural norms that govern this behaviour (Ibid.: 145). 
The focus on actual behaviour in addition to structural norms has created 
space for the explanation of heterogeneity, rather than merely reporting the domi-
nant case-scenario (systems of prescribed behaviour) and resulted in the pre-
sentation of two concrete accounts of undocumented migration. These selected 
cases were chosen because they were interesting in dealing with the same 
decision-making process, but show two different models of behaviour and social 
relations that give the reader an idea of the data upon which the generalizations 
are based.8 Furthermore, this enables the reader to visualize the whole process 
through its diversity (van Velsen 1967: 134). 
The selected cases are not just two unique situations of undocumented 
decision-making processes, even though numerical generalizations do not derive 
                                                            
broad scale theories in the research discipline, while she has to avoid being guided, or rather con-
strained, by particular theoretical positions. 
8  The comparison of different ways of individuals’ relations to society and patterns of behaviour is 
borrowed from Chanfrault-Duchet (1991: 84). 
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from them.9 Although quantitative methods can reveal the presence of two or 
more characteristics, its statistical inference does not say anything about the 
logical relation between the different variables. The contribution of case studies 
for scientific knowledge lies in their ability to make these kind of causal in-
ferences, which is ‘(…) the process by which the analyst draws conclusions 
about the essential linkage between two or more characteristics in terms of some 
systematic explanatory schema – some set of theoretical propositions’ (Mitchell 
2006: 33). This means that the selected cases, which show diversity, negative 
instances and detail, are at the basis of theoretical abstractions, whereby extra-
polation is based on logical inference (Mitchell 1973: 200). 
 
Social network analysis 
As this study deals with social relations and their influence on migrants’ behavi-
our, a social network analysis has been used. Social contacts can provide both 
constraints and opportunities for (social) behaviour, which includes the existence 
of normatively guided, as well as the ‘structurally determined limits of behavi-
our’ (Wellman 1983: 163). The ties that make up the social networks are cate-
gorized according to strength, which is ‘a combination of the amount of time, the 
emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services’ 
(Granovetter 1973: 1361) of the tie. Although Granovetter does not give any 
further operational measures for these factors, it can be roughly argued that 
strong ties include kin family members and close friends, while friends, friends 
of friends, acquaintances and colleagues can be regarded as weak ties. In this 
study the information (opportunity) and normative (constraint) content of social 
ties are analyzed in order to understand their influence on the decision-making 
process. Opportunities can be distributed through information, for example on 
migration possibilities and the situation at the country of destination, while 
normative content refers to the expectations that social contacts have of each 
other (Mitchell 1973: 9-12). In addition, I will also collect data on the size and 
structure of different (transnational) networks in order to show which elements 
affect informal migration behaviour. 
 
Life history and observation 
In order to present the social processes and cultural logics upon which the 
decision-making process is based, an in-depth analysis of the respondents’ be-
haviour and norm evaluation is required. Life histories proved to be an adequate 
tool for this. For example, MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) have used 
                                                            
9  In the process of statistical generalizations the researcher aims at drawing conclusions about the 
related existence of two or more characteristics that are found in a certain population of which the 
researcher takes a sample. 
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this method to illuminate social processes that condition the lives of clandestine 
Congolese traders. Life histories can be used as a means to explore social struc-
tural elements, by which the researcher learns about the personal histories of the 
respondents, the content of the linkages in their social networks and the function-
ing of informal networks. 
The core data comes from in-depth interviews with unsuccessful boat-mi-
grants, which in most cases lasted several hours. After a few orientating talks a 
topic list for further interviews developed. I started the interviews by inviting the 
respondent to speak freely about the period before his (first) departure and the 
trip itself. After this I started to ask more specific questions by which I went 
through different stages of the migration process, from the preparation of the trip 
to the actual trip and the return. Subsequently, the informants’ migration net-
works were discussed, his expectations about life in Europe, and finally some 
issues on his personal background. With several key informants multiple inter-
views were conducted. These open-ended interviews have been successful in ad-
dressing in-depth how the boat-migrants experienced the decision to migrate by 
boat and to get detailed information about the organization of the trip. It appeared 
that after sixteen life histories among the unsuccessful boat-migrants knowledge 
was saturated and a pattern of socio-structural relations had developed (see also 
Bertaux 1981: 37). 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in the informants’ private 
quarters, with no other persons around besides the informant and me. They were 
all but one conducted in French and afterwards transcribed in English.10 I made 
use of pen and paper for writing down notes during the interviews to secure the 
anonymity of the respondent, as the illicit nature of the topic might have prohi-
bited respondents from talking openly while using a voice recorder. 
In addition to life histories I conducted semi-participant observation by parti-
cipating in the daily life activities of my informants (see also Bleek 1987: 315). I 
spend many hours at peoples’ house and workplace, drank tea with my inform-
ants and had many informal conversations.11 Participating in these social gather-
ings proved to be very useful in building up trust with my informants and in 
understanding their everyday life situations and social structures (the opportu-
nities and constraints of social relations). For example, by observing parent-child 
interactions, the structures of authority revealed themselves to me, which I could 
later relate to the informants’ own narratives. In this way behaviour and the 
spoken word could be compared. This also showed the deviance from relational 
norms and the conditions under which the informant acted out agency (see also 
                                                            
10  The one interview that was conducted in Wolof was translated by a Senegalese friend, who I had 
taken with me to the field.   
11  The afternoon tea is an important social gathering which can take several hours. 
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Jenkins 1994: 438). Furthermore, as the decision-making on migration is a (so-
cial) process rather than a one-moment event that can be directly observed, the 
observations were directed to the outcome of the decisions instead of the in-
tentions of the boat-migrants.  
Besides these research methods, information was derived from informal talks 
and interviews with friends and family members of the informants that opened up 
the possibility to observe and better understand the social mechanisms, while at 
the same time the information given by the informants could be cross-checked.  
At the end of the fieldwork period I conducted several structured household 
interviews among family members of ‘successful’ boat-migrants in an attempt to 
better understand the influence of different household members on the decision 
making process of the boat-migrant. Due to a lack of time I was only able to 
carry out four of these interviews with two members of the household (at least 
one parent and a brother or sister).12 Sometimes practical issues prevented me 
from interviewing people one by one, when more than one person was present at 
the time of interviewing. For example, when interviewing the older sister of an 
undocumented emigrant, her mother and grand-mother were also present in the 
room. As it would have been disrespectful to ask the mother and grand-mother to 
leave the room as to be able to interview the sister alone, I decided to interview 
them together. However, an advantage of these kinds of situations was the insight 
it gave in family relations.  
Before the actual fieldwork period in Senegal several preparatory interviews 
with (informal) Senegalese migrants in the Netherlands were conducted. Al-
though none of them could be categorized as a boat-migrant, and therefore did 
not belong to my actual research population, they did give some first focus 
points. For example, they stressed the importance of relational expectations and 
interests of (transnational) social networks. Furthermore, they provided me with 
some important contacts in Senegal. 
 
Other sources 
Although undocumented boat-migration from Senegal is a relatively new phe-
nomenon on which few research exists, it has been given much policy attention 
on both national and international level. In order to find out whether policy 
initiatives match the migration reality I conducted interviews with representatives 
of several organizations.13 In addition, an interview was conducted with an 
Imam, who was also involved in a project to prevent undocumented migration, as 
                                                            
12  The initial idea was to carry out ten household structured interviews. 
13  These include the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Dakar, the Senegalese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, KadduJaraax (a local NGO) and an office on regular migration (BIT) in Dakar. 
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well as with a Senegalese sociologist who is working on migration-related 
topics.14 
Besides these interviews, I attended a three-day conference on undocumented 
migration in Jaraax, where I also presented some of my research findings. Some 
theatre forums in Jaraax that addressed the issue were visited with some of my 
key informants. Furthermore, I attended a meeting with representatives of NGOs 
on ‘how to inform the population about the risks of illegal migration’.15 As the 
phenomenon is relatively recent and scientific literature on the topic in this 
region was nearly non-existent, I mainly had to rely on Senegalese and European 
newspapers, reports and documents for my secondary sources. However, these 
sources have been handled with caution and their usability analyzed in their 
context, as media reports are ‘not only reflecting, but also actively constructing 
our senses of the social reality to which it refers (…) what people decide to 
record, to leave in or take out, is itself informed by decisions which relate to the 
social, political and economic environment of which they are part’ (May 2001: 
187, 197). 
Reliability of the data 
One of the first reliability questions stems from the selection of respondents. 
Although I made use of informants for whom the boat-migration was a past 
experience, it can be questioned if more reliable data would have emerged from 
observing and talking to people who were in the process itself. I believe not. First 
of all, my informants did not run the risk of being arrested by the police and 
therefore were willing to speak openly about their decisions, albeit in private. 
Second, decision-making is not a one moment event, but a process that could 
have started years ago and lasted until the moment of departure. By interviewing 
unsuccessful boat-migrants I was able to reconstruct the whole process, instead 
of only parts of it. Due to a lack of time and money I have not been able to in-
corporate data on ‘successful’ boat-migrants in Europe, although it could have 
been a plus for this research to explore whether their stories corresponded to 
those of my informants. With respect to the latter group, their narratives might 
have been influenced by the bad experience of failure and social stigma upon 
return. However, it can be argued that the reconstructions of successful boat-
migrants past experiences are also coloured by present-day events (i.e., dis-
crimination and social stigma in the country of destination). 
This leads directly to the second issue, the problem of reconstruction. I tried to 
cope with the gap of time between the event and the interviews afterwards by 
                                                            
14  This person asked me to guard his anonymity. 
15  The conference was sponsored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and a German 
organization. 
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spending long hours with my informants and re-discussing the pre-migration 
phase many times. As time passed and the informants started to trust me I also 
noticed that they were more willing to speak freely about their previous de-
cisions, experiences and more sensitive topics, i.e. money and their relationships 
with close relatives and friends. I believe that by gaining the confidence of my 
respondents through spending many hours with them and being introduced to 
them by other respondents or personal friends, I also gained in the reliability of 
the data. 
Thirdly, triangulation has been used as an approach to overcome the problem 
of reconstruction, by verifying information with friends and relatives of my in-
formants. However, this was not always possible, for example when friends and 
family were not informed about the migration attempt. This in itself proved to be 
interesting and I will elaborate on this in a later part of the thesis. Whenever 
family members and friends were informed, interviews or informal talks were 
conducted with them. For example, in the case of one informant, interviews were 
conducted with him, his cousin, his uncle and several good friends. Nevertheless, 
I found out that instead of throwing data away that is not confirmed or by another 
source, this data contributed to my understanding of the social structure and in-
dividual action therein. 
Finally, I enhanced reliability by checking my interpretations from time to 
time with some key informants (see also Baxter & Eyles 1997: 511). Regularly I 
spoke with my respondents about the findings of my research on which they 
agreed most of the time. However, the problem that can arise with this reliability 
mechanism is that negative findings are not necessarily supported by everybody 
of the research population. For example, during a question round after the pre-
sentation I gave at a conference on undocumented migration in Jaraax, some 
women in the audience showed openly offended and told me that the parental 
expectations and pressure on young Senegalese men is not one of the reasons for 
young men to leave the country by boat, while this was often stated by the young 
men I interviewed. This should not lead to the assumption that therefore the find-
ings are unreliable. It only means that not every category of persons in a given 
fieldwork setting might agree with the research outcomes, especially when this 
places them in a “negative” light. 
Methodological problems 
One of the first methodological problems I encountered was related to my own 
identity as a white European woman. Because it was difficult to find informants, 
I became dependent on certain informants for other contacts and interviews, 
which meant that I had to spend many hours with them. Although they have been 
an indispensable help for my study, the contact with them at times became un-
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comfortable when they started to express their “feelings” for me. I was very well 
aware of my “racial privilege” and the power inequalities in the field, whereby 
my presence as a white woman with a Dutch passport was for many men a reason 
to get into contact with me and to ask me to get involved in a ‘love’ relationship 
with them (see also McCorkel & Myers 2003). This resulted in me feeling con-
stantly pressured to show my informants that I was there only for my research, 
which at times irritated me and obstructed me from spending too much time in 
the research field. Spending time with my informants without doing interviews 
often resulted in me being overwhelmed with ‘romantic’ text messages as soon 
as I came back from the field. I tried to overcome this by shifting as much as 
possible between informants and avoided seeing the same person several days in 
a row. This was also the reason why I decided not to reside in the field, but in-
stead choose to rent a room in another part of Dakar.16 
On the other hand, the politics of identity have not always been that black and 
white, as Wolf (1992) has rightly pointed out. For example, I was very dependent 
on my informants during the research process for contacts and for understanding 
the informal migration process. Furthermore, my status as a female researcher in 
a male world also obstructed various men from telling me about some experi-
ences. For example, to a German male colleague, who did similar research in 
Dakar, unsuccessful boat migrants spoke more openly about their fear during the 
passage, while I was only told in passing. 
A final methodological difficulty has been the contact and interviews with wo-
men (wives, sisters and mothers of unsuccessful and successful boat-migrants), 
which proceeded rather laboriously. Although I did have access to women, most 
of the interviews were short (most did not last more than half an hour) and I 
always felt I needed to be in a hurry. I encountered similar problems with female 
contacts in day-to-day life. Especially among young women I was looked upon 
with suspicion, which I suspect was the result of female concurrence and the po-
lygamous relationship system. Older women were mainly occupied with house-
hold chores and small economic businesses and therefore were not able to spend 
much time on the interview. 
 
                                                            
16  This area is called Camberene II and is, depending on the traffic, one hour by public transport from 
Jaraax. 
  
4 
Regional background  
and policy initiatives 
Although Senegal is a relatively poor country on a global scale, in which eco-
nomic mobility is limited for a large part of the population, it is not the worst off 
in its region. At the same time Senegalese nationals have a large share in the 
informal boat migration from West Africa (Hallaire 2007: 27).1 Consequently, 
economic factors alone are not sufficient to explain the boat-migration phenom-
enon. Neither can political factors explain the move from Senegal, as it has been 
relatively stable since its independence in 1960. In the first part I will elaborate 
on these economic and political matters by placing Senegal in its regional con-
text. In the second part I will direct attention to the policy initiatives in the field 
of informal migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands, both national and in-
ternational, based on interviews with officials in the field and secondary sources. 
In this section I will give a short state of the art of contemporary migration policy 
and indicate areas in which policies can be improved to better fit migration 
reality. 
 
 
                                                            
1  Although formal statistics are absent on the number of informal migrants, from the amount of Sene-
galese that are repatriated it can be argued that Senegalese have the largest share in the West-African 
boat migration.   
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A relatively stable country 
Economy 
Senegal is a Muslim dominated country located on the west coast of Africa.2 
Although it belongs to one of the most disadvantaged countries in the world, 
ranked 156 out of 177 on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2008), when 
compared to other countries in the region it is doing relatively well. Ten out of 
twenty countries in West Africa are ranked higher than Senegal. Its regional 
advantage can also be illustrated by its PPP per capita which was 1,640 dollars in 
2007 and compared to other countries in West Africa on the midrange (World 
Bank 2007a).3 Although the country had to deal with some economic setbacks in 
1994 resulting from the devaluation of the CFA Franc (FCFA) and a subsequent 
inflation rate of 32%, the country is said to be on track to economic growth (5% 
since 1994) (Magoni et al. 2007: 42; World Bank 2008).4 However, rural areas 
stay behind as severe droughts have resulted in environmental degradation, while 
at the same time they have to cope with a scarcity of natural resources and de-
population. In contrast, the urban population increased (Sahel and West African 
Club/OECD 2006: 9; World Bank 2007b).5 As a result of this rural–urban shift, 
mainly to the capital Dakar, the cities’ suburbs have become overpopulated and 
put large pressure on the urban labour market. For example, the Senegalese eco-
nomy is faced with an overexploitation of maritime resources. The large amount 
of Senegalese working in the fishing industry in earlier years (15% in 2002), in 
addition to the European and Japanese vessels that have been catching most of 
the offshore fish, has caused a reduction in fish stocks (Magoni et al. 2007: 36). 
As a consequence, many urban suburbs and rural coastal towns have to cope with 
decreasing economic activities as many of its inhabitants used to rely on the 
fishing industry. Moreover, the country faces a natural high population growth, 
which has resulted in a youthful population (Riccio 2005: 101). As this under-age 
group faces a tight formal labour market it should not be surprising that 54% of 
the population lives below the poverty line, while the official unemployment rate 
is 48%.6 Nevertheless, in the region these percentages are relatively low (CIA 
2008). 
 
                                                            
2  94% Muslims, 5% Christians (mostly Roman Catholic) and 1% indigenous beliefs (CIA 2008).   
3  PPP stands for the purchasing power parity from which the GDP dollar is estimated. 
4  At this time the country also suffered from a decline in the value of its groundnut industry and rising 
petroleum prices. Despite its economic growth Senegal’s economic performance was again weak in 
2006, due to the rise in oil prices and a decline in agricultural production (Magoni et al. 2007: 42). 
5  The farming population in West Africa decreased from 80% in 1961 to 51% in 2001 (Sahel and West 
African Club/OECD 2006: 9). 
6  This 48% of unemployment does not include labour in the informal sector, while recent studies have 
estimated that informal labour (self-employment, causal labour, temporary jobs etc.) accounts for 50 
to 80 % of the non-agricultural employment in developing countries (Mofokeng 2005: 2). 
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Politics 
In 1960 Senegal got its independence from France and ever since retained a 
relatively stable political environment in the region, with only a minor armed 
conflict in 1982 in the southern part of the country, the Casamance, which aimed 
at autonomy. With some quiet intervals, this internal conflict further flared up in 
the 1990s and the beginning of 2000 (World Bank 2008; Magoni et al. 2007: 30-
31). Although it caused thousands of people to flee from the south and leaders 
and supporters of opposition parties in the region are harassed to date, the rest of 
the country was not directly affected by the conflict (Evans 2002). Besides this 
relatively minor internal conflict, the country’s political system is characterized 
by stability and its human rights and democratization are said to be at a satis-
factory level (World Bank 2008; Magoni et al. 2007: 33, 44-45).7 
From the preceding paragraphs it can be concluded that political factors 
cannot be regarded as a “push factor” for informal migrants, while economic 
figures illustrate my argument that a simple push-pull model based on income 
differences fails to appreciate differential migration responses. The claim that 
poverty alone causes this kind of migration is at odds with data that show that 
countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau, which are 
among the ten highest ranked countries on the Human Poverty Index (Maddison 
2002) do not have such a large share in the West African undocumented mi-
gration in general (Adepoju 2006: 9).8 While economic disparities certainly have 
a great influence on migration outcomes, the effect they have on shaping un-
documented migration decisions is mediated by socio-cultural factors, which I 
hope to demonstrate with this study.  
Migration policy 
Since ten years the EU has taken up policy initiatives to harmonize the manage-
ment of labour migration flows, which resulted in the tightening of immigration 
policies over the years. However, worldwide migration attempts have shown that 
these flows are difficult to manage. The recent policy initiatives aimed at closing 
Europe’s external borders have actually contributed to a rise in undocumented 
migration. In addition, the activities of small scale organizations in Dakar lack 
knowledge on the decision-making process of potential boat-migrants and have 
resulted in ineffective projects. 
 
 
                                                            
7  During my fieldwork period in Dakar some minor protests arose in which Senegalese went into the 
streets to show their dissatisfaction with governmental policies. 
8  Official sources have estimated that 60 percent of the migrants arriving on the Canary Islands by boat 
are Senegalese nationals (AfroNews, October 10, 2007). 
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The European Union 
The cornerstone of European migration policy is the intergovernmental Schengen 
Agreement (1990), which concentrates on internal freedom and external closure. 
The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) was the first agreement on the EU-level in which 
issues relating to migration were incorporated. Particularly, it moved attention to 
co-development with countries of origin of migrants; tracking smuggling net-
works and keeping migrant movements under control and finally, the integration 
of third-country nationals that reside legally in EU countries (Muus 2001: 41, 43-
44). With the Tampere agenda in 1999, the first initiatives were made towards a 
set of common conditions to manage labour migration flows among the European 
Member States. Measures were proposed in four fields, among which fair treat-
ment of third-country nationals and management of migration flows. However, 
this more positive perspective towards migrants changed after the 9/11 attacks 
and the Madrid attack in 2003 after which the agenda of the EU Justice and 
Home Affairs became more security oriented and measures were adopted in areas 
of undocumented migration, and visa and border control (Wiesbrock 2010: 114). 
The view that migrants pose ‘social threats’ to society’s cohesion has become 
more dominant and still prevails in most European countries (Wereld in Woorden 
2006: 13-14). In the The Hague programme (2005-2010), the successor of the 
Tampere programme, the importance of documented migration in making a con-
tribution to economic growth was still a priority, but at the same time more em-
phasis was placed on integration of immigrants and national sovereignty (Wies-
brock 2010: 114).  
Especially when undocumented migration from Sub-Sahara Africa increased 
in the 1990s as a result of the stricter migration policies in individual Member 
States, fears grew that a mass exodus of Sub-Saharan Africans towards Europe 
was taking place. The undocumented migrants were portrayed by governments 
and popular media as either being victims of international criminal networks or 
as being plain fortune seekers. In reality emigration from West Africa was rela-
tively modest; of the 258 million West Africans only 1.2 million are residing in 
OECD countries, compared to, for example, 1.6 million Moroccan migrants out 
of a population of 29 million (de Haas 2008: 25).9 Nonetheless, this perspective 
on undocumented migrants has had important implications for EU’s migration 
policies. 
Since the end of the 20th century, the European Union has made ‘the fight’ 
against migration one of the priorities in migration policy. In the Global Ap-
                                                            
9  The members of the OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States (OECD 2008).   
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proach to Migration in 2006 it was proposed that measures with respect to the 
management of undocumented migration needed to be reinforced. Measures 
include the sanctioning of employers of undocumented third-country nationals, 
preventing document fraud, tackling the root causes of undocumented migration 
and increasing border management and return and readmission (Commission of 
the European Communities 2006: 8-9). A year before the European Council 
launched the Action Plan “Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Fo-
cusing on Africa and the Mediterranean” that was also directed at Sub-Saharan 
Africans, while already in 2000 the Cotonou Agreement was signed by the Euro-
pean Commission and the African (including Senegal), Caribbean and Pacific 
countries. This programme, which will run from 2007 until 2020, contains mea-
sures for the prevention and fight against illegal migration, which mainly in-
volves the readmission of nationals who are illegally present in the territory of 
another party (Magoni et al. 2007: 10, 23). 
Particular programmes have been set up to tackle the undocumented migration 
streams from Africa, and West Africa in particular, towards Europe. Frontex,10 
the marine border control agency of external borders of the European Union was 
established in 2005 as a result of the large influx of undocumented migrants 
towards the Canary Islands and has become one of the most important mecha-
nisms for preventing undocumented migrants from entering South European 
countries. In addition, several West African countries, including Senegal,  have 
signed readmission agreements with France and Spain (Senegal in 2006), which 
basically means that in exchange for resources to monitor its coastline in coordi-
nation with Frontex, these countries agree to readmit undocumented migrants 
from France (Magoni et al. 2007: 23-24). 
Thus, in its attempt to regulate undocumented migration, the European Union 
has closed its southern borders and signed agreements with African states for the 
readmissions of their citizens. Although the amount of informal migrants that 
tries to enter Europe through the Canary Islands has declined from 2007 on-
wards, the approach is subject to criticism.11 First, long and dangerous informal 
migration routes developed exactly in response to the stricter migration policies 
of the EU, as formal entries have become very difficult for non-European citizens 
(Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007b: 12).12 Second, because the European poli-
                                                            
10  Although Frontex had to start with a low budget, in 2008 the available finances went up to 70 million 
euro. In 2008 four sea borders are controlled and monitored by Frontex: The Canary Islands, the West 
Mediterranean Sea, Malta and the Balkan (RAPID, February 13, 2008). 
11  According to data from the Spanish Ministry of Interior, 18057 irregular migrants reached Spanish 
soil in 2007, a reduction of 53,8% from 2006. However, this number does not include the deaths and 
persons who returned before reaching the Islands; therefore, one has to treat the number with caution 
(ADDHA 2007). 
12  The same effect between immigration policies and informal border crossing was witnessed in the 
United States in the 1990s (Wedding n.d.). 
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cies only try to prevent migrants from entering Europe, they hardly pay any 
attention to the dynamics of this kind of migration. As a result, what can be 
expected is that instead of a significant decline in the amount of undocumented 
migrants from Sub-Sahara Africa, new undocumented migration routes are devel-
oped in response to the monitoring and controlling activities of the EU along the 
African coast.13 
 
Senegal 
As a result of the signing of readmission agreements between Senegal and seve-
ral European countries, several initiatives have developed within the Senegalese 
government to facilitate the readmission of its nationals. Several governmental 
organizations are in charge to provide care for the voluntary and involuntary 
repatriations of Senegalese from Europe and African transit countries, like Libya 
(Dutch Embassy Dakar 2005: 22). The motivation for the Senegalese government 
to repatriate its nationals seems mainly to be financial. For example, in exchange 
for 5000 irregular migrants from Spain, President Abdoulaye Wade was provided 
20 million euro for agricultural development (NRC Handelsblad, February 24, 
2007). This money was said to be put in Plan REVA (return to agriculture), pro-
grammed for 2006-2008 (The Daily Monitor, May 7, 2007).14 However, when I 
was doing fieldwork the Plan REVA was not realized and caused criticism to-
wards the government from different corners of the country. 
 
Visa distribution 
Another project is the distribution of visas for temporal stays in Spain by Sene-
galese workers.15 According to a spokesperson of the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), Spain agreed to give 745 Senegalese a working contract for 
one year after which the temporal migrant had to return home.16 These visas are 
mostly for the fishing, agriculture and cleaning sector. At the IOM, the selected 
migrants are given an orientation on life in Europe.17 According to an official at 
the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of fieldwork there were 
also negotiations about visa distributions with France. However, out of the 745 
                                                            
13  As we deal with undocumented migration, it is hard to obtain statistics on the yearly influx of informal 
migrants in Europe. 
14  This program was aimed at re-developing Senegalese agriculture and at persuading youngsters to 
become farmers instead of taking a boat to the Canary Islands (The Daily Monitor, May 7, 2007). 
15  In 2000 there was another project by which 500 visas were provided for two years for those working 
in the fishing industry (Interview with spokesperson at the International Labour Organisation in 
Dakar, March 2008). 
16  Initially there should have been 2,000 visas, but the agreement is not yet fully signed. 
17  This includes a Spanish language and a social integration course to make prospective migrants aware 
of the functioning of Spanish society. 
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Spanish visas 700 are given to women. As an employee of an organization work-
ing with migrants in Dakar explained:  
‘They [women] are more likely [than men] to come back and return to their families 
once the program is finished.18 (...) Also, when they decide to go into illegality, it is 
expected that most will return after one or two years.’ 
Although the intentions for alternative legal migration are good, the function-
ing of the project so far aroused some criticism. First of all, most of the Sene-
galese that leave by pirogue are men, while the visas are mainly given to women, 
thereby not reaching the target group. Second, although 800 visas is a start, its 
number is quite limited when considering that more than twenty times the 
amount of people tried to leave the country by boat in 2006. The distribution of 
visas can therefore mainly be seen as a political strategy by Spain, by which it 
wants to show ‘goodwill’ instead of only closing its borders. Third, there is a pre-
selection for the visas, which means that the prospective migrant needs experi-
ence and education in the sector that is offered. As a result, people with few 
education or work experience are excluded from the project. Fourth, an often 
heard criticism in Senegal is that the government officials keep most of these 
visas for themselves and their family members, however, whether this is reality 
or a mere rumour is unknown. 
 
Awareness-raising programmes19 
A large group of NGOs in Dakar works on awareness-raising programmes in the 
fight against undocumented boat migration.20 This has resulted in theatre forums, 
radio and television transmissions and a small-scale art project (Au-Senegal, 
September 7, 2007).21 In accordance with the Spanish government the Internati-
onal Organization for Migration has launched a three month campaign on nati-
onal television in the second half of 2007, which visually showed the dangers of 
the trip, supported with comments by Senegal’s well known singer Youssou 
N’Dour. In addition, the International Organization for Migration established an 
information office in December 2007, where future migrants can get information 
on what is awaiting them in Europe, about the conditions during the trip by boat 
and to inform them on legal migration alternatives (Wall Fadjri, October 6, 2007; 
IOM 2007). 
                                                            
18  A similar reason was given by an official at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
19  Already in 2005 the Dutch Embassy in Dakar (2005: 30) asked for awareness-raising campaigns with 
the aim of making undocumented migration from Senegal less acceptable. At the same moment the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2006: 20) and the GCIM (2005: 35) reported the 
need for awareness-raising on smuggling networks. 
20  According to Schapendonk & van Moppes (2007c: 15) there are 62 organisations in Senegal active in 
distributing information on migration. 
21  Theatre forums are widely used in Senegal in a surge to make people aware of certain, mainly sensi-
tive topics like polygamy, incest, abuse, and HIV. 
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The idea behind these programmes is that undocumented boat-migration is 
partly the result of a lack of information about life in Europe and the risks during 
the trip on the part of the potential migrant. They therefore have to be made 
aware of the risks attached to this type of migration. It is expected that after being 
informed about the risks of the trip, the prospective boat-migrant will choose to 
stay in Senegal. However, my data shows that undocumented migrants are very 
well aware of the dangers of the trip and the living conditions in Europe. It can 
therefore be expected that these programmes will largely miss their goal in re-
ducing boat-migration. 
In recent years, many policy initiatives were developed; however, a lot of 
these programmes do not seem to be very effective (see also Schapendonk & van 
Moppes 2007c: 15), while the stricter border controls and immigration laws in 
Europe even have had the more serious negative side-effect of influencing the 
development of longer and more dangerous informal migration routes as people 
keep on moving. 
 
 
  
5 
Organization and practices 
of undocumented migration 
As most of the Senegalese boat-migrants do not own a boat, they have to rely on 
some sort of assistance in order to be able to make the sea passage to the Canary 
Islands. This assistance is organized in networks, which, as I will argue, can 
better be characterized as informal, rather than mafia-like or criminal networks, 
as some would suggest (see for example UNODC 2006: 13). In the first part of 
this chapter I will discuss the organizational elements of migration by boat. 
Based on my own observations and interviews, combined with insights from 
existing literature, I will give some background information on the origins and 
functioning of boat-migration as it is organized in Senegal, in order to better 
understand the context in which the decision to migrate is made. In the second 
part I present two cases of unsuccessful boat-migrants to illustrate how this or-
ganization works in practice for the migrants themselves and above all to show 
how social processes that are central to the decision-making process, function. 
Organizing boat migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands 
Equipment 
The boats used in the informal migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands are 
so-called ‘pirogues’, flat-bottomed wooden boats of 14 to 18 meters, which are 
locally produced and typical for the West African fishing industry.1 The inside of 
the boat has some wooden benches, but no roof on top, although one captain 
                                                            
1  The word stems from a mutation of pirogua, which is the Carib-Indian word for a dugout canoe (Tom-
kins 2008). The Senegalese mainly use the word ‘gaal’ for this boat, which means ‘canoe’ in Wolof, 
the national language. 
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mentioned that occasionally during the transport of persons an improvised roof is 
constructed in order to protect themselves from helicopter controls by the police 
and the marine guard. Another reason for the covering of the boat is to decrease 
the fear of the migrants, as the same captain explained: 
‘They (the migrants) become scared when it is getting dark. And at sea it already gets 
dark at three in the afternoon. So then we cover the boat.’ 
According to the United Nations, large pirogues carry up to 200 migrants 
(UNODC 2006: 10). My data does not confirm this finding; rather, my inform-
ants made use of small boats which ship between 50 and 80 persons (see also 
Magoni et al. 2007: 10; Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007a: 10). Most of the 
time these boats are overcrowded, which means that the transported persons have 
no place to stretch their legs or to lie down and are forced to sit up with their legs 
crossed.  
Organization for departure takes about five to six days. The boat itself costs 
around four million FCFA, depending on its state, and is paid and prepared by 
the owner. When the day of departure is set the owner buys gas for cooking and 
two motors, which also cost around four million FCFA. Some of the captains 
nowadays make use of more technological advanced equipment during the trip, 
like portable GPS systems, while others have to depend on a compass and 
general instructions. These GPS systems cost around half a million FCFA. The 
use of satellite phones, as mentioned by the United Nations (UNODC 2006: 16-
18) has not been confirmed by my data.  
Depending on the navigation skills of the captain and weather conditions, the 
trip by boat from the Senegalese coast to the Canary Islands, takes between five 
to seven days. In addition, the chances to arrive on the Canary Islands partly de-
pend on how much the owner has invested in the preparation. Several informants 
mentioned that there was often a lack of enough petrol, food and water onboard 
for the whole trip which often led to premature return to Senegal. It can be sug-
gested that this is a strategy of the owner to profit as much as possible from the 
trip by investing as little as possible. Another reason might be his/her fear of 
being arrested when the migrants arrive on the Canary Islands and squeal the 
organizer during the investigation period. Nevertheless, the organizer also bene-
fits from success stories, as will become clear later in the analysis. 
 
Points of departure 
In Jaraax a story circulates that migration by boat started from there when a fish-
ing family from Hann (part of Jaraax district) arrived unplanned on the Canary 
Islands in the beginning of 2005. It was not until they phoned home to their 
family that people from Jaraax started to believe in the possibility of arriving in 
Spain by crossing the Atlantic Ocean to the Canary Islands. Although this story 
43 
 
is not verified by official sources, its importance lies in the populations’ belief 
that migration by boat was perceived as a possibility due to successful arrival 
stories of others, mainly in 2005. In addition, a large part of the inhabitants of 
Jaraax believe that boat-migration is particular to this district and are not aware 
of the large scale on which the phenomenon exists, as one unsuccessful boat-
migrant said: 
‘They even call it [Jaraax] the airport of Senegal right now, because so many people 
have left from here.’ 
Although the migration business was booming in Northern Senegal and Mau-
ritania before, it was not until at least 2005 that it began to become more preva-
lent in Jaraax. The majority of my informants have left from coastal waters 
around Dakar and the Petit-Cote (South of Dakar) in the period 2005 until 2007 
when departures were most frequent, while present-day boat migration has been 
directed further south (the Casamance region) and even to Guinea Bissau, which 
mainly has been the result of the stricter marine controls along the coastal waters 
of Central Senegal and the increased media attention since mid-2006 (Schapen-
donk & van Moppes 2007b: 12).2 This prevention is visible; when walking on the 
beach of Jaraax one can see two boats lying some hundred meters in sea. One is a 
large patrol boat of the Frontex and the other a smaller Senegalese marine ship. 
Helicopters fly along Dakar’s coastlines several times a day to search for suspi-
cious boats, meaning those that ship more than ten persons. According to one 
captain, the marine patrols are at times distracted by taking up to ten persons in 
small pirogues to open sea where they gather in a larger boat that ships them to 
the Canary Islands. During the time of my fieldwork the departures from the 
Dakar region had significantly decreased and boats were departing from more 
southern regions. As one unsuccessful boat migrant explained: 
‘Now there is a lot of noise [mainly media and governmental attention] about the 
pirogues, there are a lot of surveillances. When you want to leave now, you have to 
go to the Casamance or Koalack. There is a lot of marine patrol along the beaches of 
Dakar now.’ 
The shift in the point of departure is confirmed by media reports, which have 
mentioned boats departing from the Casamance region (see for example Sud 
Quotidien, October 22, 2007).3 
 
 
                                                            
2  One of the captains mentioned that boats leaving from Guinea Bissau use the Cape Verde Islands as a 
transit point from where another boat is taken that sails to the Canary Islands, a trip that can take up to 
12 days (see also Dutch Embassy Dakar 2005: 21). 
3  It is suggested that most of the migrants who take the boats from the Casamance are from the Kolda 
region (South Senegal) (see for example Sud Quotidien, October 22, 2007). 
44 
 
Arriving on the Canary Islands 
When a boat arrives on one of the Canary Islands, predominantly Tenerife, the 
migrants are incarcerated and have to wait for a judicial process. Imprisonment 
can be up to a maximum of forty days, as is set out by current Spanish im-
migration law, during which officials attempt to discover the identity and na-
tionality of the migrant. If they succeed and a repatriation agreement exists 
between Spain and the country of origin, the migrant is forcibly sent home (Ryan 
2008: 6; Kitamura 2007). On the other hand, when the identity of the migrant is 
not recovered within these forty days or when no repatriation agreement exists 
with the country of origin, authorities have no choice but to ship the migrants to 
mainland Spain where they are distributed across the country. This is the loop-
hole that boat-migrants aim at, even though this means a live without documents 
or legal rights (Dutch Embassy Dakar 2005: 16-17; Migration News 2006; Za-
pata-Barrero & de Witte 2007: 87). 
Several of my informants who made it to the Canary Islands mentioned that 
Senegalese officials work for the Spanish government in order to find Senegalese 
nationals among the arrived boat-migrants. As one of them mentioned: 
‘We had to show up in court, but there was a Senegalese who let us down. He 
worked for the Spanish officials and investigated us. He told us that the Senegalese 
government had stopped sending people back, so we told him we were from Senegal 
and after that we were repatriated, because he had not told us the truth.’ 
As a result of Senegal’s repatriation agreement with Spain since September 
2006, the largest part of the Senegalese boat-migrants who arrive on the Canary 
Islands is forcibly sent home. Nevertheless, stories circulate among potential 
boat-migrants about the possibilities to overcome this. For example, some have 
mentioned that Spanish employers take several strong Senegalese workers with 
them to mainland Europe.4 Another strategy is to tell Spanish officials that one is 
from Gambia, for which there is no repatriation agreement with Spain, or else not 
to say anything at all during the 40 days. A final strategy could be to apply for 
asylum (van Wijk 2007: 35), although none of my informants spoke about this 
option to me, possibly because they were not aware of the possibility to make use 
of this. 
 
Who is involved? 
A first observation of the organizational networks of Senegalese boat-migration 
to the Canary Islands shows that different actors are involved, who are mostly 
linked to each other through personal contacts (see Figure 3 for organizational 
structure).  
                                                            
4  This has been mentioned by several unsuccessful boat-migrants and a captain, who has made the sea 
passage several times.   
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Figure 3 Organizational structure of boat-migration network in Jaraax. 
 
 
The first person in the networks is the owner of the boat, who invests money 
by buying a boat and needed materials for the sea passage. He is also the one 
who takes care of the preparation of the boat and pays for food and water that 
will be used during the trip. Other persons, mostly friends or relatives of the 
owner, are appointed as recruiters who actively look for clients to fill up the 
boat, by using word of mouth. When he has recruited enough clients (mostly 
around ten), and negotiated a price with them he gets a commission and/or a free 
place in the pirogue, which he can use for himself or give away to whoever he 
wants. A third important link in the organizational network is the captain, usually 
a fisherman, who is in charge of sailing the boat and who knows the sea well. 
The organization’s informal character also shows in the payment for the captain, 
which is not fixed and seems to depend on his negotiation skills.5 The captains 
are in most cases migrants themselves, who leave the boat behind and mingle 
with the other migrants as soon as the Canary Islands are reached (Schapendonk 
& van Moppes 2007a: 9). Besides the captain, the crew and navigators, a team of 
about six persons provides assistance on the boat, besides other chores. As one 
recruiter mentioned: 
‘There were those who prepare the food in the boat. There are people who look out 
for the coastguard on the coast. There is one who buys the food, one who buys the 
petrol, one who buys the motor. There is somebody who collects the money and 
                                                            
5  During several interviews I heard that the owner pays the captain one or two million CFA Franc per 
trip, besides giving him two free places on the boat. In contrast, Schapendonk & van Moppes (2007a: 
10) found that the captains are not paid and instead were obliged to pay for the food for the trip. 
Assistants on board 
    Recruiters 
       Boat owner 
      Captain 
Navigators 
     Supporters 
    Public officials 
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there is one who organizes the transport. The owner cannot do everything himself; he 
needs a team to organize it for him.’ 
Other persons involved in the organization are supporters, who for example 
provide assistance to undocumented migrants in the form of accommodation 
when the place of departure is a geographical distance location from where they 
live. However, this function is not strictly separated from others in the network. 
For example, one informant mentioned that at the time that he was recruiting he 
also had taken several people in his house who were waiting for the boat to leave. 
A final category of persons involved in the organization are public officials, who, 
through bribes, can assist the functioning of the informal boat-migration. In one 
case it was mentioned that the owner gave money to the marine guard to be able 
to let the pirogue sail out of the harbour without any difficulties. However, 
whether this happens on a large scale is unclear. 
 
Informal organizational networks 
This organizational structure resembles what other researchers have found among 
smuggling and trafficking networks (Schloenhardt 1999: 18-20, in Içduygu & 
Toktas 2002: 35-36) which have proven to be more informal than what was com-
monly assumed. For example, the UNODC (2006: 13) speaks of the profession-
alization of organized crime in Senegal’s undocumented migration networks. 
However, I did not find any evidence of forced migration or the role of large 
mafia-style trafficking networks in the organization of undocumented migration 
from Senegal to the Canary Islands, even though in some cases financial exploit-
ation was present. Consequently, the concept of ‘human smuggling’ seems best 
to fit the present organizational structure, albeit with a locally based character.6 
In the case of Senegal, the smugglers are owners of the boats, either former 
fishermen or rich locals involved in the fishing industry, who have shifted their 
activities to the more profitable informal migration market (see also Schapen-
donk & van Moppes 2007b: 14). 7 Therefore it can be argued that it is better to 
speak of locally based informal networks rather than large international mafia-
like networks (see also Brachet 2005). 
 
Having focused on the organization of the Senegalese boat-migration, I will now 
direct attention to the experiences, motives and social context of the boat-mi-
grants. Two case studies of unsuccessful boat-migrants will be discussed in order 
to illustrate the social processes at work in informal migration decision-making. 
                                                            
6  Van Wijk (2007: 46) has proposed the term facilitators for these kinds of networks, which resemble 
the organizational structure that was found in this study. However, for broader international relevance 
the term ‘smuggling’ will be suggested. 
7  Migrants themselves refer to these organizers as ‘owner of the boat’. 
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The first case describes in detail the history of a failed boat-migrant who in-
dividually made the decision to leave several times, while the boat-migrant in the 
second case was selected by another member of his household to leave. 
The case of Ibrahima: ‘I want to do the maximum to leave’ 
Ibrahima is 23 years old, born and raised in Jaraax and has tried up to three times 
to leave by boat for the Canary Islands. His formal education ended at the age of 
ten, after which he worked for seven years as an apprentice in his grandfathers’ 
metal industry. As he was in training he did not get a salary, which is common in 
Senegal. When his father retired it was expected of him to financially take care of 
the family and as a result he decided to quit his job at his grandfathers’ place to 
begin working as a cleaner for an Italian waste company. This ended when the 
government broke the contract with the employer after which everybody was 
dismissed. Ibrahima managed to find his present job as a cleaner at the Ministry 
of Environment, where he works a couple of hours a day, five days per week and 
earns around 55,000 FCFA per month (around €80). With this salary he pays 
15,000 FCFA for the electricity, 5,000 FCFA for water and 10,000 FCFA for the 
food his aunt prepares for him twice a day. In addition, he gives 15,000 FCFA 
each month to his father, spends 5,000 FCFA on his breakfast and is able to save 
the remaining 5,000 FCFA. 
He is the son of the second wife, who died when Ibrahima was still young, of 
his father. After her death he was raised by one of his father’s other wives, who 
also has a daughter, Adema. Ibrahima’s father, whom he visits from time to time, 
lives in Mbour, south of Dakar. As his work is located in Jaraax it is more 
practical for him to live their where he has found a room in the background of the 
house of his uncle Abdou, not far from the company where he is working. The 
younger brother of his father, who made two attempts to make it to the Canary 
Islands, lives in another suburb of Dakar with his wife and two children, his older 
and younger sister. Their father, Ibrahima’s grandfather, used to live in France 
and worked there in a car factory, but died when his children were still young. 
His uncle Abdou, who is retired and used to work in water management, 
shares the house with two of his three wives and their four young daughters. The 
house is situated on the road towards the beach and consists of different parts. 
The first section, where Abdou lives with his wives and children, is made out of 
cement and gives place to different bedrooms, a kitchen, toilet and shower, and a 
salon. In the living room different images of Medina are displayed, which relate 
to his pilgrimage he made to Mecca several years ago. Having his own house, his 
pilgrimage to Mecca and his polygamous marriage shows that he is relatively 
well of financially. Behind the house lies a little courtyard surrounded by small 
rooms, made out of wood, brick and corrugated cardboard. This is where Ibra-
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hima has his room which he shares with his cousin Magueye (28) during week-
days, who works as an apprentice in the garage across the road. During the 
weekends Magueye visits his mother and younger sister in another part of Dakar, 
Yembul. 
Ibrahima’s room is bigger and more luxuriously furnished than most of the 
rooms I have seen at his friends’ places. He has a wooden double bed, a little 
table and a wooden bench, some closets, a little refrigerator in which he keeps 
water, a stereo, a DVD player and a large television. On the walls of his room 
hang some images of religious leader of the Tijane, the Islamic brotherhood to 
which he belongs.8 Two other rooms in the courtyard are occupied by two of his 
aunts. One of them is a second wife, who takes care of the meals for her husband, 
who works and sleeps in Jaraax during the week. The other aunt of Ibrahima 
shares her room with her seven year old son, Pap, whose husband died several 
years ago. She makes a small commerce by selling ataaya, the local tea, in the 
morning on the fish market, but is not able to earn enough money to support 
herself and her son. In the back of the courtyard are another three rooms, which 
are occupied by men who work in the neighbourhood and take the food Ibra-
hima’s aunt prepares every day. On the left side of these rooms are the shared 
toilet, the shower and some chicken runs. 
Ibrahima is a quiet young man, who does not talk much and mostly keeps on 
the background in social settings. In his spare time he visits his friends from the 
neighbourhood and some colleagues. His best friends are Cheikh and Moham-
med, whom he knows through the job at the Ministry of Environment. They do 
not live far from each other and meet regularly outside the job.  
 
Networks of (undocumented) migrants 
Because a large part of Ibrahima’s family members have migrated (see Figure 4), 
it can be said that he comes from a migrant family. His uncle Baay (50) lives in 
the United States since 1999. He left Senegal with a visa to work in the United 
States as a teacher. He has his residence permit and brought several visits to 
Senegal, the last time being in 2004. He married an American woman in 2001, 
while he has another child, who lives in France, with his Senegalese ex-wife. 
Baay has a house in Castor, not far from where Ibrahima’s room, which he had 
already built in 1993. In addition, he owns a small shop next to the house and a 
telephone centre. To Ibrahima’s displeasure Baay only sends money to his 
mother every two or three months and not to other family members: 
 
                                                            
8  Tijan is one of the stricter Islamic movements, which results in Ibrahima praying five times a day, 
something he never omits, no matter where he is. He also does not drink, nor smokes and visits the 
mosque every Friday. 
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‘He does not give anything and we know that he has money, because he has a big 
house.’ 
Another point of concern to Ibrahima is the unwillingness of his uncle to help 
him arrange a visa. He has been asking his uncle for several years, but he keeps 
on telling him that he has to wait. At the time of fieldwork they did not have any 
contact with each other. 
His aunt Sene (46), with whom Ibrahima used to share the house before she 
left Senegal, lives in Italy since 2002. In Senegal she made money with buying 
and re-selling dried fish on Jaraax’s fish market. Sene left Senegal on a tourist 
visa for which she paid three million FCFA, which was given to her by her 
brother Baay and her ex-husband, and she has not been able to arrange a resid-
ence permit for Italy yet. During sporadic telephone contact (once every two 
months) with Ibrahima, she explains that she shares and apartment with other 
Senegalese and works in agriculture. Since her departure she has been able to buy 
a piece of land in a Senegalese village to build her own house, but to date she has 
not yet been able to start with the construction. His close relationship with her 
allows him to ask her for money when he has a problem, although he has never 
received anything from her. Nevertheless, he considers her to be an open person, 
who you can more easily ask for help than other contacts. 
Another migrant relative is his cousin Abdoulaye (25), who lives in Italy since 
seven years and left on a tourist visa for which his father paid 2.5 million FCFA. 
He does not have a residence permit and works as a cleaner on an irregular basis, 
while he used to work as a fork-lift truck driver in Dakar. Last year Abdoulaye 
bought a piece of land in one of Dakar’s suburbs, where the house, which is 
meant for the family, is still under construction. In the meantime he married a 
Senegalese woman. Every month he sends money home for his father to pay for 
the water and electricity bills. Ibrahima complains that his cousin does not send 
him any money, especially since they were close before his departure when they 
used to share a room. Ibrahima hears about his cousin from telephone contact 
Abdoulaye has with his brother Magueye to whom he explained that he only has 
a little bit of work, that it is cold in Italy and that life for immigrants is hard. 
Ibrahima does not believe him: 
‘There are migrants who say that they don’t have any money, but that is not true, 
they put it all on their bank account and build a beautiful house with it (...) they are 
liars.’ 
Magueye once received a picture of Abdoulaye from Italy from which Ibra-
hima concluded that his cousin has changed for the better, as he had become 
bigger and was better dressed. 
His uncle, Bocar, who has been in Italy since two years has been able to build 
himself a large house for his wife and two sons in Keur Mbaayfall, a suburb on 
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the outskirts of Dakar, where plots of land are mainly bought by migrants.9 As 
the ability of his uncle to build a house and buy a car within two years is in 
contrast with success stories of other migrants, for whom it normally takes longer 
to do so, Ibrahima suspects his uncle of being involved in criminal activities.10 
This rumour has been rebutted by another relative of Bocar, who told me that he 
was able to obtain a residence permit by marrying an elderly Italian widow 
whom he left as soon as he had his papers. During informal conversations I had 
with Ibrahima he often complained that his uncle has become arrogant since his 
departure by neglecting his cousin. Nonetheless, he also envies his uncle. When 
on my request we went to visit the house of his uncle, Ibrahima told me en route: 
‘My uncle has been able to construct a nice house and buy a big car, which is why I 
want to do the maximum to leave. I also want to have a nice house, a beautiful wife 
and a big car. That is what I want.’ 
Two other cousins of Ibrahima, the older brothers of Magueye, have left for 
Europe. The oldest one (38) is in Italy since two years and works there as a 
mechanic. He left with a visa and visited Senegal once for two months.11 His 
other cousin (30) is in Spain since one year and left by boat from the Casamance. 
Without a legal residence permit he tries to make money by selling his merchan-
dise on the streets. 
Ibrahima’s network of migrants is not restricted to members of his family, as 
also some of his (best) friends are residing in Europe. For example, Moussa (24), 
a former neighbour, left in 2006 by boat. He does not have a residence permit 
and works in the wood industry, in which he was also active before his departure. 
Ibrahima believes that his friend has a good life in Spain, even though his 
financial status has not improved much. He has never received anything from 
Moussa and he does not ask for anything either. Based on the picture he has seen 
on a phone he had sent to his sister, Ibrahima says that the colour of Moussa’s 
skin has become lighter, which he considers to be a positive change.  
A former neighbour, Bocar, left by boat in 2007 and lives in Spain at the mo-
ment. From stories he heard from the family of Bocar he knows that Bocar does 
not have a residence permit and works as a street vendor. Another friend mi-
grated to Belgium, where he married a local woman. During our conversations 
Ibrahima expressed repeatedly that he has to leave because a lot of his friends 
have made it to Europe.  
                                                            
9  The land out of the city is cheaper than the land in Dakar, which makes it easier for migrants to con-
struct a house in these ‘new suburbs’. 
10  My informants regularly told me that the ability to build a house for migrants takes about four to six 
years. 
11  According to Ibrahima he got this visa by winning a contest for mechanics, which was organized by 
the Italian government. 
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From the preceding paragraphs it can be concluded that most of Ibrahima’s 
contacts abroad are residing in Europe, mainly in Spain and Italy.12 Ibrahima 
knows more than ten men from the neighbourhood who have made it to Europe 
by boat and who are residing there right now. In addition, Ibrahima has numerous 
friends, colleagues and neighbours who have attempted to leave Senegal by boat, 
albeit with unsuccessful outcomes. For example, from the job, Cheikh, Moham-
med, Alioune and Ibrahima have tried to leave in this way, which took place 
around the same time of his own departure. He knows of one neighbour who died 
during the crossing. 
 
Pre-migration phase 
In 2007 Ibrahima decided to leave by boat to the Canary Islands. During this time 
he talked with some of his friends about migrating. In May one of them, Xadime, 
told him that he knew an old man, Bocar, who owned a boat that he was pre-
paring for departure. Ibrahima asked his friend if he could introduce him to this 
man. When they met, Bocar told Ibrahima that the trip would cost 400,000 
FCFA, to which Ibrahima responded that he did not have more than 350,000 
FCFA and tried to persuade him by saying that he was desperate to leave. After 
some negotiation Bocar agreed with the money and told Ibrahima to wait another 
week for the actual departure. Because he did not have a mobile phone at the 
time, he gave Bocar the fixed telephone number of his uncle Abdou to call him 
when the day of departure was set. During this week Ibrahima tried to persuade 
others to accompany him on his trip. His cousin Magueye reckoned the trip to be 
too dangerous and decided not to leave with him. His friend Taffa refused as a 
result of a lack of financial resources. Only one friend, Ousmane, told him that he 
was interested, after which Ibrahima introduced him to Bocar with whom he 
negotiated a price of 400,000 FCFA. 
Ibrahima claimed that the money for the trip came from a lottery he took part 
in since 2007. The idea is that a group of people hand-in money every month, 
which in this case was 25,000 FCFA.13 Every month this group comes together 
and their names are written on a piece of paper. The name of the person that is 
drawn from the pile of papers wins the pool. Ibrahima won 250,000 FCFA the 
second month they were playing. Before this he had asked his aunt in Italy for 
200,000 FCFA, to whom he did not tell the actual reason for this amount. Instead 
of telling her about his migration plans he told her that he was coping with a lot 
of financial problems out of fear for her disagreement. In a response she said that 
                                                            
12  Ibrahima does not have any contacts in other parts of Africa. 
13  It has to be mentioned that this is a very large amount, as normally prices range between 100 to 1,000 
FCFA per week (see for example Salam Fall 2007: 143).  
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she was not able to help him out financially due to unemployment at the moment. 
He told me that he understood her position. 
Several days before his departure Ibrahima had a conversation with Magueye 
about his plans, during which he told his cousin that his life in Senegal is difficult 
and that he needed to do something to leave. In addition, he told him he had to do 
this because many of his friends had done so. When Magueye realized that he 
could not stop his cousin he took him to a marabout, a magical-religious spe-
cialist. This is a person who knows the practice of magic and is considered to be 
a mediator between human beings and the spirits (Gemmeke 2004: 72; Franklin 
et al. 1996: 325). Their service is for hire and based on their type of knowledge 
and prayers they can offer ‘healing, protection, fulfilment of wishes and the 
elimination of enemies with the help of secret knowledge of the Qur’an’ (Gem-
meke 2004: 72). The marabout told Ibrahima to wash himself with ‘holy water’ 
he could buy from the marabout and was instructed to do the same twice a day 
during the days he had to wait for departure.14 He also had a talk about his 
departure with his uncle Abdou, who disagreed with the plan as a result of the 
risks of the trip. Consequently, Ibrahima did not mention the actual day of 
departure. In addition, he talked about his plans with one of his best friends, 
Cheikh, who was also preparing for departure by boat himself and they wished 
each other good luck for the trip.15 While talking to some of his relatives and 
friends, Ibrahima decided not to talk about his plans with his father. Superstition 
is the reason for this, as he believed that the possible disagreement of his father 
could have resulted in misfortune during the trip.  
A couple of days before his departure Ibrahima brought his friend Taffa a visit 
to talk about his plans. During one of our conversations in his telephone shop 
Taffa mentioned that Ibrahima came to ask him for advice about the sea to which 
he was familiar as a result of his former job as a fisherman: 
‘He asked me how the sea would be at a certain moment, if it would be livable, these 
kind of things (...) Sometimes I was scared that he was going to leave as I did not 
want him to die.’ 
Two other friends tried to discourage Ibrahima from leaving by telling him 
that they knew of various people who had not survived the trip. However, Ibra-
hima was sure that this was not going to happen to him. 
The day of departure Ibrahima got a phone call from Bocar, who told him that 
the departure would be that night at nine o’clock from Fajoul, a village south of 
Dakar in the Siné-Saloum Delta. In an effort to keep open the possibility of re-
turn when the trip would fail, Ibrahima told his manager that his father was ill 
                                                            
14  This ‘holy water’ contains some spices or plants and a verse from the Koran. 
15  A couple of weeks after Ibrahima’s first failed migration attempt Cheikh left, but did not succeed 
either. 
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and in order to take care of him he needed ten days off. Although his manager 
first refused and explained that ten days was too long, Ibrahima was able to 
convince him not long after.16 Before he left the house Ibrahima was sure to 
make a mystical sacrifice, a so-called gris gris, and asked Magueye to pray for 
him.17 He gave his cousin his passport, which he was instructed to send to 
Ibrahima upon arrival in Europe in order for him to be able to arrange a residence 
permit. Ibrahima took with him 30,000 FCFA as pocket money and the telephone 
number Taffa had given of one of his friends who lives in Spain. Taffa had ex-
plained this friend that one of his friends was soon going to arrive and asked him 
to help Ibrahima with finding accommodation. 
 
Migration phase  
Ibrahima travelled by public transport via Mbour to Fajoul, the point of depart-
ure. Around mid-night they were told to board a small boat, which would bring 
them to a larger one that was situated a bit further out at sea. Some first problems 
were encountered when the small boat got stuck in a sandbank after which all the 
men had to use their force to take it out. Before the large boat is entered it is 
washed with holy water with the belief that this will bring good fortune on open 
sea, after which the persons that get onboard are instructed to wash themselves 
with the same water. Some 100 persons had entered the boat, among who Ibra-
hima recognized four other men from his neighbourhood. They greeted each 
other and he placed himself next to Ousmane with whom he had a short con-
versation, while others were falling asleep. The first couple of days the trip 
passed as planned but this came to an end when the fourth day, close to Morocco 
and some 60 kilometres from the Canary Islands, water started to enter through a 
hole in the boat. The captain instructed everybody to take of their t-shirts to fill it 
up, after which some panic arose. Ibrahima was afraid to die from drowning as he 
was not able to swim and started to cry. In the next moments the captain decided 
that there was a need to return to Senegal as they would encounter another set of 
waves close to the Canary Islands for which the boat would not be resistant. A 
discussion flared up between the captain and men that refused to return, during 
which Ibrahima kept quiet, afraid of what was going to come. The captain’s 
decision was enforced and three days later at four o’clock in the morning they 
arrived back at Dakar. 
Ibrahima’s return was not easy and carries a lot of weight on him: 
‘The first days were like I still was in the boat, than I was lying in bed and still felt 
the movement of the boat. I thought a lot when I came back (...) When I wanted to go 
                                                            
16  He asked for no more than ten days as otherwise he would have been cut on his salary. 
17  A gris gris is an animistic rite, which is done to protect oneself against different kinds of external in-
fluences. 
55 
 
to sleep I thought “why am I still here while a lot of my friends are there [in 
Europe].” That touched me deeply.’ 
The first days after his return he had trouble sleeping and felt disappointed. 
However, the stories he told his friends about the trip are full of pride and he told 
them that even though it was hard, the ambiance during the trip was good and 
everybody was singing songs for God. After some days of rest he decided to go 
back to work. 
A couple of weeks later Bocar phoned Ibrahima to inform about another boat 
that was being prepared for departure. This time they will leave from Jaraax. The 
owner is not going to refund the money to any of his clients and consequently 
they are only left with the choice to either try again or to lose their money. 
Ibrahima decided to try again. This time he only spoke about it with Magueye, 
who still disagreed and to whom Ibrahima responded: 
‘But what should I have done? Should I have left the money? The least I could do 
was to leave again (…) If you have a friend here that has left and is there (in Europe) 
now, than you have to do like him. So I had to try again.’ 
As Abdou did not agree with him leaving the first time Ibrahima decided not 
to tell him about his second attempt. Although his friends on the work floor were 
informed about his first attempt, his manager was not. To get some time off from 
the work he told his manager that his father was still sick and asked for another 
six days of leave, after which the manager agreed. Before departure he underwent 
the same rituals as the first time and washed himself again with the holy water. 
At night everybody boarded the boat on the coast of Jaraax, but when they 
wanted to leave the harbour they were stopped by the marine guard and send 
back to the coast. The boat and one of the gas bottles were apprehended, while 
Bocar was put in jail. He was released after he had paid the police some money 
and they warned him that the next time he will be imprisoned for a longer period 
of time. Afterwards Ibrahima was told by Bocar that he had to pay three million 
FCFA to recover the boat and to let them through during a subsequent attempt. 
A third departure was prepared during the next weeks and again Ibrahima 
decided to make use of this opportunity, although this time he did not mention 
his departure to anybody neither did he ask for sick leave. But this time the boat 
is again stopped by the marine guard, according to Ibrahima, as a result of one of 
the mothers of the men on the boat calling the police as she did not want her son 
to leave. After this attempt a large part of the clients brought charges against 
Bocar when he refused to refund their money, which resulted in the incarceration 
of Bocar for four to six years.18 
 
                                                            
18  Ibrahima’s friend Ousmane, who joined him on his first two attempts, told me another story about 
Bocar. According to him, Bocar himself has left with by boat and lives in Spain at the moment. 
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Post-migration phase 
After these three attempts and having lost a large amount of money, Ibrahima is 
still in Senegal. Although he claims that his attempts to leave the country by boat 
are over, due to the low chances of arrival and the high costs, he still dreams of 
migrating.19 In a later stage he played with the idea to go to Gabon, to work in 
the metal industry and from there to make the move to Europe.20 This was after 
Taffa had told him that some of his friends had done this. Ibrahima turned away 
from this plan when he heard that in addition to the high crime rate in Gabon he 
found out that the flight tickets were expensive. He also applied for one of the 
800 visas for Spain, but until today he has not received any response. In addition, 
he tried to obtain a green card for the United States by participating in a lottery, 
organized by the American Embassy, for 3,000 FCFA.21 His most recent plan, at 
the time of my fieldwork, was to leave for Turkey at the end of 2008, for which 
he had to buy a visa for 600,000 FCFA from a Senegalese businessman whom 
one of his friends has introduced to him.22 The goal of this trip was to enter 
Europe through Turkey and Greece. However, two years later I have heard that 
he is still in Jaraax where he recently got married.  
The case of Pierre: ‘It was my sister who told me I had to leave’ 
When I met Pierre, 27 and unemployed, in Jaraax he passed most of his time 
preparing and drinking the local tea (ataaya), played checkers and chatted with 
his friends on the street or at their place. He only took breakfast when he received 
some money from his older brother or sister. After he played basketball at six 
o’clock at night he proceeded the evening by visiting friends until midnight. In 
addition, Pierre was an active member of the Christian community and spent a lot 
of time on church-related activities.23 
The room of Pierre was located in a house in Jaraax where he lived with his 
uncle Papis and some other tenants. The room was a small space of no more than 
nine square meters with two of the pink walls covered with posters and pictures 
of American hip-hop singers and Senegalese artists. In one of the corners hang a 
large poster of Jesus Christ and on the small wooden table in the corner stood 
                                                            
19  Although he would step in a boat if they would take him for free. 
20  I have heard from time to time that people leave for Gabon and South Africa to work there for a while 
as it is said to be easier to enter Europe from these countries. 
21  There was a lot of publicity for this lottery in late 2007. 
22  Ibrahima expected that around that time he would have won the lottery a second time as he was still 
playing. In addition, he had asked his aunt in Italy for a part, which he wanted to refund when he 
made it to Europe. According to Ibrahima, she agreed with this plan. 
23  Senegal is a predominantly Muslim country with a small Christian minority mainly living on the coast 
and the south of the country. Mainly as a result of post-independence politics and the lack of ethnic 
cleavages in the colonial period, the country is characterized by religious tolerance and harmony (Sow 
2003: 75; Kukah 2007: 158). 
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some pictures of family members. Pierre was born in Mar Lodj, a small village in 
the Siné-Saloum Delta, some 140 km south of Dakar. When his mother died in 
1999 his father moved back from Jaraax to the village to take care of Pierre’s 
younger sisters, who lived there. Both girls died in 2003 and 2004 from malaria, 
shortly before their father passed away. Now Pierre was the youngest of the 
family with only one older sister, Madeleine (30) and a brother, Papis (34) (see 
Figure 5). Madeleine was divorced and lived with her two children at the house 
of her aunt in Jaraax, where she was working as an apparel maker and sometimes 
was given some money by her previous husband. Pierre’s uncle Papis, with 
whom he shared the house, worked at an association in Jaraax and sometimes in 
Mbour, where he guided tourists. Papis was also divorced and had two children 
who stayed in a Christian boarding school in Koalack.  
Pierre’s educational career ended in 2000, when he was about to finish his 
high school. During this time he encountered problems continuing his studies 
after his mother passed away. In addition, he could no longer pay the tuition fee 
as neither his father nor his brother supported him and he did not have the 
financial resources himself to do so. After one year of being unemployed he 
started an apprenticeship to become a shipping-agent. When he left the training 
two years later he found a job at a company where he organized the employees, 
but resigned when they refused to pay him his salary. Thereafter he started to 
work at the port where he was unloading fish, but he found the working activities 
too risky, while he did not get any insurance, so he decided to he resign. In the 
summer of 2007 he started a job with one of his cousins as a painter, although at 
the time of fieldwork in 2008 Pierre was unemployed and had plans to start his 
own shop with a friend. In the meantime he still dreamed of finishing high school 
and of going to the university. 
 
Networks of (undocumented) migrants 
Pierre’s migrant network is small, both in his circle of friends as well as among 
his family members. From his family, there are only two who are residing 
abroad. One of them is his older brother Papis, who moved to France six months 
ago after having married a French woman with whom he has a child. Pierre keeps 
several pictures of them in his room. At the beginning of 2008 his brother was on 
a two month visit in Senegal, which he mostly spent in their native village. Al-
though Papis did bring some presents with him for Pierre’s birthday, he has not 
send any money back home. According to Pierre’s older sister this is not how it 
has to continue: 
‘He has only been there since six months so he doesn’t have any money yet. But he 
will send us money in the near future.’ 
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In the meantime Pierre has asked his brother several times to help him with a visa 
for France, but his brother’s response has so far been negative: 
‘He tells me all the time that it is very hard there [in France] and that going to France 
is really difficult.’ 
The only other migrant family member is an uncle who lived in Italy and who 
paid around two million FCFA for a French visa in 2004. After a short stay in 
France he moved to Italy. The year he migrated he also got married to a 
Senegalese woman, with whom he now has a child. He arranged his residence 
permit in Italy which enabled him to visit Senegal in September 2007. Before his 
departure Pierre was in close contact with this uncle and they used to share the 
same house. Consequently, Pierre is disappointed that his uncle that he has not 
yet helped him to get him to Europe, even though, according to Pierre, his uncle 
has told him he is willing to do so. The same counts for the money neither Pierre 
nor his sister has ever received from him: 
‘If he really wanted to help me he could have done so, he could have given me 
money to open a shop, than I wouldn’t have the need to go to Europe anymore.’ 
In the past years some of Pierre’s acquaintances tried to leave for Europe by 
boat of which two men from his neighbourhood did not survive the passage and 
died. From the ones that did succeed, two were friends. One is his childhood 
friend, Assiz, a Muslim, who left in 2000 by plane for Italy. In 2006 he married 
his cousin, who lived close to Pierre’s house.24 When Assiz visited Senegal for 
two months in August 2007 he brought Pierre a mobile phone. According to 
Pierre his friend has become European, referring to the shift in his ideas. For 
example, Assiz complained about the rubbish on the Senegalese streets and about 
the heat. On the other hand, he also became bigger and less mentally troubled:  
‘You know, here you have the misery, which makes you think a lot and causes you to 
lose weight.’ 
Another friend is Mamadou who left two years ago by boat for France. From 
his four closest friends some are for and others against migration by boat, while 
none of them has ever made an attempt of which Pierre was aware. 
 
Pre-migration phase 
Madeleine, Pierre’s older sister, is the one who initiated the migration move of 
Pierre, because, in her words, ‘(…) there [in Europe] is work and a lot of money’. 
She started to believe in the success of boat-migration when she heard of some-
one from the neighbourhood who had left in this way and who arrived in Europe.  
 
                                                            
24  This cousin is the daughter of the sister of his mother. 
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When in spring of that year she heard from a recruiter, who was working for a 
boat-owner in Jaraax that they were preparing a boat for departure Madeleine 
thought about her brothers: 
‘My other brother [Papis] was in the village and Pierre was here. That is why I pro-
posed it to him.’ 
Although Pierre believed that migration in general can be a way of supporting 
the family financially, he did not agree with his sisters’ plan and claimed that 
destiny should not be forced. He explained that ‘everything depends on what God 
has planned for you.’ He told his sister that he did not want to leave by boat as he 
believed that the journey was too risky. Nevertheless, Madeleine insisted and told 
him she wanted him to leave for Europe so she would be able to pay for the basic 
necessities and to open her own shop in the future. Together with her aunt, 
Madeleine tried to convince Pierre by telling him that there is a lot of work and 
money in Europe, with which he could help the family. In the situation where 
both of his parents are deceased and with his older brother in the village, 
Madeleine was not only his sister, but also his elder, who had to be obeyed, 
which is reinforced by his financial dependence on her. Even though Pierre did 
not agree with the plan he felt pressured to respond to his sister’s wishes. Not 
long after he learned that one of his colleagues, who had departed by boat some 
time before, had reached Spain and this gave him more confidence in the success 
of the trip and he told his sister that he would prepare to leave. After much 
difficulty, Madeleine and her aunt managed to collect the money and paid the 
recruiter 500,000 FCFA, after which they are told to wait until the pirogue is 
filled up.25 
Pierre did not feel comfortable about his prospective trip and decided to ask 
somebody to join him. He informed his colleague Cheikh about his sisters’ plan 
and asked him if he was willing to come along. Initially he refused, but Pierre 
insisted and convinced him, after which Pierre talked to Cheikh’s uncle, the 
manager at the job, who guarded his cousin’s savings. While Cheikh did not dare 
to ask his uncle for his money, Pierre felt that time was pressing and was able to 
convince the uncle by telling him that he had a lot of friends that had arrived in 
Europe by boat who financially were doing well. After this, Pierre met the re-
cruiter and negotiated with him a price of 500,000 FCFA for Cheikh. 
Pierre kept quiet towards his friends about his prospective departure and 
neither informed his uncle Papis. About his silence towards the last he explained: 
‘If I would have told him about my plans and he would have disagreed, then I 
wouldn’t have been able to leave even when the money was already paid. Also, when 
                                                            
25  Not everybody was willing to talk about how they were able to collect the money for the trip, like 
Madeleine or Pierre. Later on I will give some examples on how money was collected from other 
cases. 
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for example I want to go to the village and he tells me to stay here then I have to stay 
here.’26
 
 
His plan was to leave without telling anybody and calling home as soon as he 
arrived in Spain: 
‘When you tell everybody that you are going to leave you will never arrive. Here, 
you have the power of speech that can prevent you from arriving (...) You always 
have people that start talking (...) That is the African reality.’ 
A similar situation applied to Madeleine, who did not inform anyone about the 
prospective departure of her brother, for the same reasons as Pierre. She told me 
that plans have to be kept a secret as otherwise people might start talking which 
can prevent the departure. Not surprisingly than, Papis, Pierre’s uncle once told 
me during an informal talk that none of his family members had ever been 
involved in the boat-migration. Also Magueye, one of Pierre’s best friends, told 
me that he did not know anything about the migration attempt of his friend. One 
of the only few people Pierre spoke to about his departure was his girlfriend at 
the time. She responded by crying and told him that he would die, after which he 
tried to reassure her by telling her that it wouldn’t be that bad. Although Ma-
gueye was not informed, his cousin Ibrahima was, as he was also planning for 
departure: ‘When both of you are preparing to leave, it is easier to speak about 
it.’ Pierre did not call any of his contacts in Europe to tell them about his plans, 
as he did not feel sure about the success of the trip and therefore wanted to wait 
until he reached Spain before he contacted anybody. Because Madeleine has 
initiated the plan and wants her brother to be safe she did notify one of her 
friends in Spain about her brother’s expected arrival. 
During the week that they have to wait for the departure, Cheikh, who did not 
live in Jaraax, stayed in the house of Pierre. These days Madeleine took Pierre to 
a marabout to ask if it would be a good day to leave. The marabout explained 
that he did not foresee any difficulties during the trip and so it is safe for him to 
leave. Pierre might have been convinced about the words of the marabout before 
he left, but after his return he argued that ‘the marabout tells you what you want 
to hear, that you can leave’. 
 
Migration phase 
On the day of departure Pierre got a phone call with the instructions to take a bus 
for Joal, situated some 110 km south of Dakar on the Petite Côte, where they had 
to wait for the boat. Early in the morning a small boat brought small groups of 
people to a larger one that was awaiting them a little bit further in sea, with 
                                                            
26  The same counts for his father, had he still been alive. In this case he would have talked to him and 
explained why he had to leave. If his father would have refused he would not have insisted and left the 
idea. 
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which they eventually left for open sea with 60 to 80 people. According to Pierre 
all necessities for the trip were on board, from food to navigation material. 
Nevertheless, the boat was packed with people and everybody was forced to stay 
seated. During the trip Pierre was scared as he did not know how to swim and 
was afraid that boat would break down: 
‘It was difficult. There were waves of three meters, but everybody thinks about 
arriving. It is a risk and without protection everybody thinks about dying. Some did 
not eat anymore. Some stayed seated for three days without standing up, out of fear. 
Nobody says it is easy (…) once you are in the water you will die.’ 
Besides his fear he felt tired and seasick, but nevertheless, he claimed that at 
times when they had food and when it was possible to sleep for a while it was not 
so bad. 
After seven days the captain decided that they had to return to Senegal as they 
were running out of petrol and food. However, when they arrived in Dakar five 
days later, Cheikh noticed that the captain had some petrol left, which would 
suggest that there would have been enough for the whole trip. According to 
Pierre the reason for return was not the lack of patrol but the anxiety of the 
captain for incarceration upon arrival on the Canary Islands, a practice he had 
heard about over the radio during the trip. 
 
Post-migration phase  
When Pierre and Cheikh returned at Jaraax they rested for some days in the 
house of Pierre. The first days after his return were hard for Pierre; he had lost a 
lot of weight and he was feeling nervous. He thought about his failed trip and the 
money his sister and aunt had paid for it. Madeleine mentioned to me that the trip 
had changed Pierre, as ‘he has had some problems, because he has seen a lot on 
the sea’. 
Pierre was certain that he did not want to leave again by boat and when the 
owner called with the proposition to try a second time for the same money, Pierre 
refused. He decided not to inform his sister about this and instead told her that 
the money was gone and that there was no other possibility to leave again. 
Nevertheless, several months after his attempt Pierre still dreamed about leaving 
for Europe, but no more by boat: 
‘Some lose their senses in the pirogues and some die along the way. You become 
crazy if you are not strong. One day I will go to Europe, but not anymore in this way 
(…) It is the will of God [whether or not you are able to go to Europe].’  
Pushed by his sister, Pierre had to ask the owner for a refund who explained 
that all the money was spent on food and petrol. Not being able to tell her that he 
could have left a second time, his disappointed sister was informed that the 
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money is lost. Pierre did not tell anybody about his failed trip and stayed in the 
house for a couple of days to recover. The only one he called was his girlfriend: 
‘I called her as soon as I returned. I had lost weight and asked her to pray for me. I 
told her that maybe she had done something to prevent me from arriving.’ 
When I asked him if he suggested that she might have gone to a marabout to 
prevent his arrival, he answered, ‘yes, it is possible, we believe that’. Neverthe-
less, Pierre’s boat migration experience was over and he and his sister directed 
their hopes to their brother in France. As Pierre explained, ‘now with my brother 
in France it is not necessary anymore to leave by boat’. 
The preceding cases illustrate the variations in undocumented migration deci-
sion-making behaviour. In addition to the differences, they both reveal the social 
processes that are central to the workings of undocumented migration. In the next 
chapter I will elaborate on these processes and show how a person’s undocu-
mented migration decision-making is structured by social forces. 
 
     
 
 
6 
Social dynamics of 
undocumented migration 
networks 
With the closing of the South European borders and the tightening of the visa 
regulations, there are few opportunities left to enter Europe in a legal manner. In 
effect, numerous Senegalese fishermen have taken this opportunity to shift their 
declining revenues from the fishing industry to the more profitable boat-mi-
gration. The two selected cases show the different ways in which people with the 
wish to migrate respond to the availability of this undocumented migration route. 
I will argue that variations in migration decision-making outcomes among boat-
migrants can best be explained by placing the decisions in their socio-cultural 
context. The main part of this chapter is therefore dedicated to the analysis of 
how different social networks with their related cultural elements shape the moti-
vation and decision to migrate by boat. Based on this social analysis a conformist 
and opportunistic decision-making model are extracted. 
A poor man’s option? 
Ibrahima and Pierre are, like all my other informants, young men. This is indi-
cative of the sex composition of the boat-migration flow, which is confirmed by 
more recent findings that migration is selective of men between the age of 20 and 
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40 (Schoorl et al. 2000: 60).1 My data further suggests the presence of migrants 
with low educational levels as well as low skilled jobs with related low salaries.2 
Having a hard time making ends meet, these men have little possibilities for 
social and material improvement. Furthermore, due to their low incomes they 
cannot afford to leave the parental house, which also counts for those who are 
married (with children).3 Six out of 16 informants were married with children, 
which suggests that marital status does not or only slightly matters in the choice 
to stay in the country or to leave (see also van Dalen et al. 2003).4 Despite their 
low salaries, it has to be mentioned that the poverty of these men and their 
families is relative, meaning that they are not the poorest of the country (see also 
Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007a: 6; Lahlou 2005: 5; Pradhan 2007: 32). Al-
though for example their financial resources do not allow them or their children 
to study, the majority of my informants was able to pay for their basic necessities 
(food, drink, rent when necessary, transport etc.) and was not immersed in finan-
cial misery.  
If it is assumed that these boat-migrants are rational beings who act out of 
purely economic motives, then several questions can be raised. First of all, 
although these people might act out of a perceived net economic benefit, then 
how can the risks that are inherent to this migration flow be incorporated into 
their cost-benefit calculation? After all, dying is one of the possibilities when 
taking the sea-journey. Secondly, this approach does not explain differential 
outcomes for persons with the same low economic status. Despite the popularity 
among Senegalese young men to migrate to Europe, this certainly does not mean 
that every person decides to make use of the undocumented sea-route to Europe. 
Based on previous migration related research and my own data I will suggest that 
a better understanding of informal migration behaviour can be achieved by taking 
into account migrants’ embeddedness in different sets of social relationships, 
whereby family, friendship and smuggling networks are the most important in 
shaping (undocumented) migration outcomes. Contrary to previous studies on 
documented migration behaviour, I did not find any influence of membership in a 
religious brotherhood on the decision to migrate by boat, although further re-
search is necessary to explore this more in-depth. In what follows I will discuss 
how the social dynamics of family and friendship relationships as well as more 
monetized contacts shape the motivations and decisions of undocumented boat-
migrants from Senegal to the Canary Islands. 
                                                            
1  Although there have been some reports of women on board, boat-migration is still dominated by men. 
2  All except one of the informants had a job at the time of departure.  
3  Survey data of Schoorl et al. (2000: 60) suggests that 40 to 50 percent of the Senegalese young men 
migrate from their parents’ household. 
4  As these findings are based on a small group of people, it cannot be said that they are significant for 
the wider population and therefore have to be handled with caution. 
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Kinship networks 
Authority and conformism 
Kinship relations are an important feature of West-African life as they provide a 
sense of protection and solidarity. These social systems, which are mainly or-
ganized by age and sex, are structured according to relationship expectations that 
are inherent to a so-called collectivist “we-culture”. The main expectations that 
structure family relationships are manifested in obedience, complying with 
orders of mostly authoritarian persons, docility, the tendency of people to fulfil 
social norms even when they are in conflict with their own opinions, and con-
formity, adjusting to the real or imaginary pressure from the outside world (Mat-
sumoto & Geluk 1997: 142). This roughly means that older brothers have control 
over their younger siblings and fathers over their children and wives (see also 
Beuving 2006: 93; Fleischer 2006: 5).5 In addition, within the household a gen-
dered division of labour places women in charge of domestic affairs, while men 
are expected to financially take care of their parents and siblings. Especially after 
the father retires the older sons are expected take care of their elder(s), which 
often results in them quitting their education and finding themselves a job (see 
also Mbow & Penda 2006: 59). This was the case for Ibrahima, who decided to 
leave his education as it was expected of him to financially take care of his 
father. As many young men in Senegal are dependent on low wage jobs, this 
expectation of sharing puts a lot of pressure on their own lives, as the norms of 
conformism, obedience and docility does not leave these men much room for 
making their own (financial) decisions. This process can lead to a high level of 
frustration, as a friend of Ibrahima explained: 
‘The problem here is that parents don’t work and the sons have to take care of the 
whole family. If the parents would be working, then together we would be able to 
take care of the household, but that is not how it works here. I am the only one who 
has to take care of the whole family and you can never say that to your parents that it 
is like that.’ 
 
Migrant consumer culture 
The family pressure and the related frustration among young men who have 
difficulties in building up their own life is reinforced by the wish for social 
mobility by both family members as well as by the young men. Already settled 
migrants who have been able to invest their earned money in the construction of 
a house, a marriage, and the purchase of a car in their country of origin, con-
tribute to the formation of a relatively new ‘migrant consumer culture’.6 The 
pattern of luxury consumption of successful migrants and their families stands in 
                                                            
5  In Senegal these kinship structures are further complicated by polygamous marriages. 
6  Adesina (2007) has coined the term ‘middle-class ideology of consumption’ for this phenomenon. 
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contrast with the lifestyle of those who stay behind (see also Riccio 2001b: 585).7 
Their lack of resources results in a form of relative deprivation, in which the 
perception of poverty is redefined; it does not matter what somebody has, but 
more what this person does not have in comparison to his wealthier migrant 
neighbour. Among the ones who are exposed to this highly valued migrant 
consumer culture, a desire for luxury goods in an attempt to achieve the same 
status, can become an powerful motivation to migrate (see also Curran & Saguy 
2001: 63). It are mainly urban dwellers who are affected by this; they live in the 
outskirts of the city and belong to the lower regions of society, while on a daily 
basis they are exposed to the achievements of their more wealthy co-nationals. 
As they see little alternatives in achieving this standard of living, to them, a move 
to Europe seems inevitable (see also Salam Fall 2007: 151). In effect, people 
migrate not so much out of an urge to minimize economic risks for the house-
hold, but rather out of a wish to purchase luxury items and social upward mo-
bility.  
This process can be seen on both the household as well as the individual level. 
The expectation for young men to take care of the other household members 
surpasses the need for the contribution to the daily nourishment as household 
members might send a younger relative abroad in order for them to achieve a 
more luxury standard of living. Besides the construction of a house and the 
purchase of cars, lifecycle celebrations, i.e. baptisms and weddings are important 
events for showing one’s wealth and status. The high amount of money that mi-
grant households are spending on these status symbols contributes to relative 
deprivation among other households that have to ‘compete’ with them and, in 
effect, the pressure on financial resources from sons is high. When they are not 
able to contribute to social mobility for the household by staying in the country, 
household members, based on the collective ‘we-culture’ can decide to send one 
of their members to Europe.   
The other side of the coin is that a combination of the demanding elements of 
this collectivist culture on young men and the expectations of consuming luxury 
goods can actually amplify the incentive to migrate for these young men them-
selves. As one unsuccessful boat-migrant commented: 
‘In Europe it is different, because maybe there it is hard, it is better. There you have 
work, money and not much expenses, because your wife and your family are not 
there with you who ask you all the time for money. Here you have to pay for the 
Grand Magal,8 the ceremonies and also for the food. When you are the only one in a 
house of ten that is working on a daily basis than it is hard (...) When you are in 
                                                            
7  It should be mentioned that only the Western wealth and luxury products are positively valued, while 
Western cultural norms and values are not. 
8  The Grand Magal is the annual festival of the Mouride brotherhood, which takes place in Touba 
(Coulon 1999: 195). 
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Europe and you cannot pay for something you just do not pick up the phone and you 
keep on working until one day you have enough money to send home.’ 
This illustrates that the pressure to share one’s revenues with other family 
members exists next to the urge for individual social upward mobility and an 
urge for independence. This individual desire for self-satisfaction is not largely 
discussed in recent migration research in which the focus is more on household 
incentives (see also Adesina 2007). My data shows that for many young men, 
influenced by the success stories of other migrants, a higher social status and 
independence from the family are important reasons for leaving. As one unsuc-
cessful boat-migrant explained: 
‘I just want to live my dream, to have a beautiful villa and a nice car. That is what I 
want. I do not want to stay with my family. When you have a nice villa people from 
the neighbourhood give you respect. They say: “Do you see that villa? The owner is 
in Italy”, and so they know that he has a lot of money. That is why they give them 
respect. Without money you are nothing here.’ 
By migrating to Europe these young men from the less advantaged strata of 
society believe they will be more respected in their social environment as soon as 
they send money home to their family or start constructing their own house. In 
addition, as a successful migrant, the chances of getting married increase as their 
position as son-in law rises.9 As could be seen from the migrant networks of 
Ibrahima and Pierre, many of their migrant relations married a woman after they 
had left Senegal, a result of the status these men were assigned back home even 
when they were not yet financially successful. However, the expectation that they 
will be doing economically well in the future has resulted in many parents 
deciding to have their daughter(s) married to migrants from whom a large dowry 
can be demanded. Therefore, parental expectations for their daughters’ future are 
not only influenced by the migrant consumer culture, but also motivates future 
migration (see also Riccio 2001b: 586; Mbow & Penda 2006: 71). 
For many young men, leaving for Europe means a possibility to respond to 
family demands, while at the same time they expect to be able to pursue in-
dividual goals in life. These motivating factors are related to the place a person 
has in the household. For example, older sons will be more pressed to migrate in 
order to fulfil the familial expectations, while for younger sons this factor is less 
relevant. Rather, they leave out of a desire to improve their own life and to have 
as great an extent of independence from other social contacts as possible (see 
also van Donge 1992: 184). However, in the dominant discourse on collective 
solidarity, individual success is not highly valued especially not by well-estab-
lished senior members. Consequently, most young men will never mention in 
public that they want to pursue their own goals in life. Instead they mention that 
                                                            
9  Several informants mentioned that their girlfriends had left them for a migrant. 
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financially taking care of other family members is the most important reason for 
them to leave. 
 
Transnational family networks and lack of social capital 
The preceding paragraphs have sketched the socio-cultural context in which 
migration decisions are made, which relate to both documented as well as un-
documented migration behaviour. Social relationships can also specifically shape 
boat-migration. When a person has the intention to migrate, the question of how 
he is going to accomplish this has to be answered. One of the most common 
means of entering Europe is to travel on a temporary tourist visa, which can be 
received via a contact in a European member state. Instrumentalist thinkers on 
social capital argue that membership in certain networks enable a person to make 
access claims on scarce resources, which in this case would be a travel document. 
However, when looking at the normative and information content of family net-
works it becomes clear that this is not always the case. For example, Ibrahima, 
who belongs to a large migrant family, is not able to mobilize his overseas con-
tacts to accomplish his own migration plans. 
When a member of the family migrates he is expected to share his future 
revenues with the family members who stay behind. Ibrahima’s contacts instead 
told him that their life in the West is difficult and living conditions expensive, in 
an attempt to justify their inability (or unwillingness) to help. Others have gone a 
step further and severed all contact with their extended family members. In this 
way, one avoids being asked for help and from disappointing the relatives. For 
the ones at home this means that the migrant is not able to move in a legal man-
ner to Europe with the financial and/or material support from this network. As 
this avoidance is not what is expected from family members, the behaviour of the 
migrant by the ones who cannot make use of his/her resources is explained in 
terms of jealousy, competition and the person becoming toubab.10 The logic 
behind this is easy to catch. As a result of the optimistic ideas about life in the 
West it is in general assumed that being a migrant equals having money for those 
at home. As a result of the familial obligation to share, the ‘rich emigrant’ is 
expected to share his wealth with other family members. Therefore, the anger and 
incomprehension that result in a discourse on jealousy and competition derives 
from the belief that the emigrant is unwilling to help those ‘at home’. As one 
unsuccessful boat-migrant explained about the impossibility to make use of his 
transnational family contacts: 
                                                            
10  In West Africa toubab is used to indicate white persons. However, in this case toubab is not related to 
skin colour but more to character traits that are attributed to Western people, e.g. forgetting those who 
stay behind and becoming more individualistic.   
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‘My older brothers tell me all the time that life is difficult in Italy.11 But if life is 
really that hard, then why are they staying there? If it is really hard they have to 
come back. They have built nice houses here and they work to help their parents, but 
they refuse to give us (other family members) money, so we can leave as well. This 
is because they are afraid that you will become wealthier than them. I know that, 
because they have the means to help me and they refuse. What else should I think?’ 
This illustrates that by leaving the country relationship patterns can change 
when the emigrant abandons the familial obligations. In effect, for the ones at 
home it becomes more difficult to make use of their transnational kinship net-
works for their own benefit. Thus, even though a person can be a member of a 
large migrant family network, this does not automatically mean that he is able to 
convert these contacts into useful social and financial capital. What makes the 
difference is the kind of family tie. In most cases migrants do tend to share their 
resources (when they can) with direct family members (parents and direct sib-
lings) at home. This is probably the result of interfamilial expectations and the 
fear for social sanctions, especially when this person has the future intention to 
return to the country of origin. This is illustrated by the case of Pierre and 
Madeleine, who both expressed that their brother in France will help them within 
a reasonable amount of time. This can also have consequences for future migra-
tion: When already one person of the close family is abroad, there is less pressure 
for other siblings to do the same thing. Yet, this is only the case when this mi-
grant sends enough remittances to arrange social upward mobility for the ones at 
home. When the migrant only provides for his own upward mobility, competition 
among siblings can become an extra incentive for (undocumented) migration. 
Friendship networks 
Peer pressure 
Although friendship relationships have received relatively little attention in mi-
gration related research, my data indicates that these networks both at home and 
overseas can significantly influence the decisions and motivations for undocu-
mented migration behaviour. More so than with family members, a discourse on 
the possibility of undocumented migration can be found among peers. Talking to 
friends about the decision to leave does not only occur in order to ask for advice, 
but also to encourage others to come along, as it is believed that leaving together 
can form a source of mutual support during as well as after the trip.  
Although friendship networks at home do not have such a large impact on the 
decision and motivation for undocumented migration, this does not count for 
transnational friendship relations. Contact with friends is mainly characterized by 
indirect information, as most migrants restrict contact to their direct family mem-
                                                            
11  These were the sons from another wife of his father. 
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bers. This means that membership in these networks does not lead to social capi-
tal, a result of complex relationship norms. In contrast to certain family contacts 
it is an unwritten rule not to ask friends for support. Besides the lack of social 
capital, friendship networks can influence undocumented migration decision-
making through peer pressure. First of all, success stories of others who have 
made it by boat to the Canary Islands triggers future boat-migration, as the 
perceived chances of arriving in Europe increase.12 As one unsuccessful boat-
migrant explained: 
‘First I was not interested, but then my friends started to leave in October 2006. I 
thought it was suicide and asked myself, “How are they able to go from Senegal to 
the Canary Islands?” I did not believe in the possibility to cross the ocean with a 
pirogue. But my friends arrived and after them many others. Even very close friends 
left. So I said to myself, “why don’t I leave?”’ 
This suggests that the more persons in one’s social network have tried to leave 
by boat, the more likely this person himself will attempt to make use of the same 
route. However, this process can also work the other way around; during the time 
I was doing fieldwork, decreased chances of arrival, mainly due to the large 
amount of repatriations from the Canary Islands, have caused a decrease in the 
number of attempts. However, this has not ceased people from making use of 
undocumented migration routes. Rather, alternative routes are developed for 
which the chances of success are believed to be higher. 
In addition, migrated friends play a large role in the development of relative 
deprivation, and thereby can motivate (undocumented) migration behaviour. For 
example, Ibrahima justified his departure to his cousin by telling him that he had 
to leave because many of his friends had done so. As a potential boat-migrant 
commented:  
‘I have a lot of friends and neighbours that have left and that motivates me to leave 
as well. These people did not have any education, but after they migrated to Italy 
they started to construct their own house. So I thought, “Why do I stay here? While 
my friends with less education can build a house and have a car, while I cannot”. 
That is why I left school and started to work. I said to myself, “If I have a million I 
can leave and become like them.”’ 
The idea that life in Europe is all positive is further constructed by telephone 
contact with migrated friends and during return visits. Interactive informal in-
formation distribution (worth by mouth) is the dominant way in which country 
and migration specific issues receive the ones at home, which means a depen-
dency for information on social networks. Contact between friends, mainly weak 
ties, is characterized by prejudiced positive information of life in Europe in order 
to live up to what the migrant believes is expected of him. This also counts for 
                                                            
12  Schapendonk & van Moppes (2007c: 14) have called this the ‘self-propagandizing process’. 
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return visits of migrated friends, who have the tendency to show their newly 
acquired wealth, even when this does not reflect reality. For example, one day a 
migrant friend of one of my informants came to the house where we had gathered 
to watch television. His performance stood in sharp contrast with the others in 
the room and confirmed the stereotypical migrant; wearing large golden neck-
laces and fancy clothing. However, when I had a chat with him in Dutch,13 I 
found out that his life as a migrant was not all that positive, but his friends in the 
room all believed that he had become a rich man. Nonetheless, there are also 
migrated friends who do try to give a more realistic picture of life in Europe, 
even during return visits. This can sometimes be experienced as problematic, as 
one visiting migrant explained: 
‘When I tell my friends in Senegal that life in England is hard, they get angry with 
me and tell me I should not tell them that. They just do not want to believe me.’ 
Among the receivers information is mostly processed according to the strength 
of the tie, whereby strong ties are considered to be more reliable sources of 
information than weak ties, based on perceived trust in the relationship. Both 
strong and weak ties can contain positive and negative messages of life in 
Europe, however, when it comes to strong ties, the negative information will be 
more likely to be perceived as realistic. In order for this to happen, people need 
to have contact on a regular basis next to a strong emotional relationship. Espe-
cially strong relationships with persons who live an informal life in the West can 
adjust the too optimistic image of ‘the migrant’. In effect, the more strong ties a 
person has, the more realistic his picture of Europe will be, and consequently, the 
lower the expectations of life as an informal migrant. However, when a person is 
not a member of a strong migrant network, but instead has only sporadic and 
indirect contact with transnational contacts, the less trust he will have in the 
information they bring when it comes to negative images. Consequently, their 
image of the West will be more positively biased, thereby reinforcing the mo-
tivation for undocumented migration. For those with a more realistic idea of in 
Europe, the likelihood of departure by boat will decrease.  
A final remark can be made on the availability of migrant networks upon 
arrival. Based on migration studies from Mexico to the United States, Massey et 
al. (2005) argued that reliance on transnational networks increase in relation to 
the height of risks attached to migration. As undocumented migration routes in 
general can be considered to be more dangerous, due to clandestine border cross-
ing as well as dependence on smuggling networks, it can be expected that un-
documented migrants rely more on their transnational networks. Surprisingly I 
found that most of my informants did not prepare anything for arrival in Europe. 
                                                            
13  He happened to live in the Netherlands. By communicating in Dutch I prevented others from hearing 
our conversation and expected him to give less socially desirable answers. 
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This was for several reasons. First of all, the majority believed that they could 
rely on the solidarity of the migrant community in different European countries. 
Although in some cases reference was made to a strong network tie in a parti-
cular European country, in general it was expected that the Senegalese commu-
nity would be willing to help newly arrived migrants. Secondly, uncertainty of 
the success of the trip as well as social stigma cause boat-migrants to keep silent 
towards their transnational contacts, as it is unclear whether this person agrees 
with this mode of migration. Therefore, many take a phone number of a trans-
national contact with them, who will be phoned upon arrival in Spain, as it is be-
lieved that expected relationships of solidarity are stronger than the social stigma 
associated with undocumented migration.14 
 
Sorcery and social stigmatization 
Although there is a dialogue on boat-migration among peers, when the agreement 
is made with the organizers, the migrant and his family members (when they are 
aware of the plans) keep this from as many people as possible. An important 
factor in this is the belief in witchcraft and sorcery. Witches are believed to be 
ordinary people who possess certain supernatural powers with which they can 
harm others. Although this is mainly referred to in the context of physical illness 
(Franklin et al. 1996: 325), their role is evident in boat-migration behaviour. It is 
believed that certain persons possess the ‘power of speech’, meaning that their 
words can harm others, and with this can endanger the success of the sea-jour-
ney. As the carriers of this power are unknown, nobody can be trusted besides 
close kin. In addition, people are convinced that sorcery can cause bad fortune 
for boat-migrants. For example, out of jealousy an acquaintance15 of the boat-
migrant can try to prevent a person from arriving by means of so-called mara-
boutage, spells acted out by magicians or marabouts (Ibid.). One unsuccessful 
boat-migrant explained that ‘with magic friends can do anything, they can go to a 
marabout, that is real’. This belief in sorcery and witchcraft is widespread in 
Senegal (see also Franklin 1996: 325; Gemmeke 2004: 72) and a reason for boat-
migrants and their family members not to communicate their migration plans to 
others.  
Another reason for withholding information is the illicit nature of the phenom-
enon. When a greater number of persons know about the departure of a boat, the 
chances of arrest increase, while the chances to make use of this opportunity 
                                                            
14  In reality this is not always the case. During my fieldwork in the Netherlands I came to understand 
that also within the migrant community a social hierarchy exists between documented and undocu-
mented immigrants. Although out of solidarity the undocumented immigrants are helped by the docu-
mented community members, they are expected to keep quiet and not to be a burden to the first group. 
15  This can be a wife, relative, friend or neighbour (see also Gemmeke 2004: 73). 
74 
 
diminish.16 In addition, fear for social stigma among boat-migrants and their 
family members keep them from talking about their plans. For example, among 
Pierre’s closest friends a negative attitude towards migration by boat can be 
observed. Out of fear for social criticism, he does not tell his friends about his 
departure, in which he perseveres even after his return. Historically extensive use 
of migration in Senegal (for more detail see Hallaire 2007) has led to a so-called 
‘culture of migration’, meaning that migration has become ‘deeply ingrained into 
the repertoire of people’s behaviour, and values associated with migration be-
come part of the community’s values’ (Massey et al. 2005: 47). However, this 
does not count for undocumented migration routes, not even in areas like Jaraax, 
where a large part of the population has taken part in this migration flow. In 
effect, decision-makers, whether this is the migrant or his senior family member, 
are very careful and selective in distributing information on the migration plans 
in an effort to avoid social stigmatization. This is also the reason why in most 
cases potential boat-migrants and their family members do not inform trans-
national contacts before arrival in Europe. 
Smuggling networks 
Besides family and friendship relationships, organizational networks of boat-
migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands have an effect on the decision-
making process among potential boat-migrants and/or other family members. For 
many people information on the possibility of the alternative sea-route is re-
garded by potential boat-migrants and their families as an opportunity to leave, 
especially when they hear of others who have made use of this. For these people, 
leaving the country in a legal manner has become extremely difficult, while the 
opportunity to leave by boat is considered to be easier, cheaper and more certain 
than leaving by plane. In addition, making concrete plans and actually deciding 
to leave by boat only occurs when information on the departure of a boat had 
reached my informants. Thus, the availability of this alternative route for those 
who express the wish to migrate, and the establishment of contact with the 
smuggling network, comes before the actual decision to leave via the sea-route. 
The lack of present-day sea-transport from Central Senegal is therefore another 
reason why attempts to leave by boat for the Canary Islands have decreased in 
this region during the last few years. 
As smugglers want their boats to fill up as quickly and quietly as possible, 
recruiting clients is mostly done through personal contacts in the area from where 
the owner of the boat lives, although boats do not necessarily leave from this 
                                                            
16  Schapendonk & van Moppes (2007c: 17) mentioned the same for the reluctance to share migration 
related information among Sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. 
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place. This means that the client is in direct or indirect contact with the owner 
through friends, neighbours or relatives. As one unsuccessful boat-migrant com-
mented: 
‘A friend of mine introduced me to his older brother, the recruiter, and explained to 
me that a friend of this brother owns a boat that was preparing to leave for the 
Canary Islands.’ 
As most owners are former fishermen, recruitment in the same neighbourhood 
means that the majority of boat-migrants come from coastal areas. Yet, there are 
cases in which the potential boat-migrant actively searches for a smuggling net-
work, which mainly occurs when the person does not live near the coast. None-
theless, these contacts are still characterized by personal contacts, as one unsuc-
cessful migrant from an inner suburb of Dakar explained: 
‘I contacted somebody in Ziguinchor [the Casamance] to ask about the possibilities 
and price for departure. This is a man who builds pirogues in the Casamance. I asked 
a friend for the number, because I knew that his brother had left by boat. When I had 
the number I contacted the owner of the boat and asked him how much it would cost 
and when he would be leaving.’ 
The price that has to be paid for the sea-crossing is subject to the negotiation 
skills of the client17 and the relationship this person has with the organizers. The 
closer one is to the owner, the lower the price, which also explains why Ibrahima 
was able to negotiate a price of 350,000 FCFA, as he was in direct contact with 
the owner of the boat, while the sister of Pierre, who had to bargain with a re-
cruiter, was not able to go below a price of 500,000 FCFA.18 This money has to 
be paid within a very short period of time, as the time between hearing of a boat 
that is going to leave and the actual departure is no more than a couple of days to 
one week. Convincing friends to come along can influence the price. In an 
attempt to fill up the boat as quickly as possible, organizers of the journey might 
suggest a lower price when the client is able to recruit more people. Yet, differing 
relationships with other organizers can also be an incentive for friends to leave 
through varying channels. 
One of the advantages of personal relationships in this informal migration 
organization is its contribution to the (perceived) amount of trust, which is of 
vital importance for both the smuggler as well as for the client, who have to rely 
on oral agreements. During the negotiation of the price, the owner ‘promises’ the 
client an arrival on the Canary Islands.19 In theory this means that the migrant 
can try to reach the Islands as many times as possible without additional payment 
                                                            
17  I use the term ‘client’ here as this person can be both the potential migrant as well as another person 
who negotiates the price. 
18  Informants have mentioned prices ranging from 200,000 up to 1,000,000 CFA Francs. 
19  This does not include a transfer to Europe. When the migrant is repatriated from the Canary Islands 
the agreement is over and he will lose all his money. 
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for every successive attempt. In return the owner will refund the migrant when 
the Islands are not reached and he decides not to make any further attempts. 
Direct or indirect personal contact with the organizers helps to establish these 
kinds of oral agreements as it heightens the confidence of the client over the 
owner’s trustworthiness. After all, large amounts of money have to be paid. For 
the owner himself trust is also of importance, not only as a result of the informal 
and illicit nature of this kind of migration, but also for his reputation. When more 
people hear that taking the sea-journey through this person has resulted in 
persons arriving at the Canary Islands, the future economic transactions of the 
owner will be secured. Therefore, ‘doing good’ and being trustworthy can be an 
incentive for owners if they want to continue their activities in the undocumented 
boat-migration. However, in practice it often turns out that the owner does not 
refund anything or only part of the money, while only leaving the migrant the 
option of another free trial, that is, when he has another boat ready for departure. 
This was the case for both Ibrahima and Pierre, even though Ibrahima knew the 
owner from the neighbourhood. The owner explained to him that he had spent all 
the money on the previous trip and therefore was not able to give a refund. 
However, when the clients feel that they have been mistreated, they can decide to 
go to the police and in this way put more pressure on the owners to act according 
to the agreement. There are also many cases in which the owner of the boat flees 
the country when he can or will not pay a refund and when he has no other boat 
ready for departure. 
Coping with physical risks 
One of the factors that make undocumented migration different from its formal 
variant is the high amount of risk attached to it. In the preceding paragraphs I 
already mentioned the chance of losing financial resources and how people cope 
with social stigmatization. Even more obvious and visible are the physical risks. 
The first question that can be asked is whether the ones that engage themselves in 
boat-migration are aware of the possibility of dying? In contrast to positive bias 
on the information that people take on about life in Europe, my data shows that 
people are generally well informed about the dangers of the trip before departure. 
From the beginning of the boat-migration, word was spread in the suburbs about 
people that did not survive the trip. Consequently, many were discouraged by 
these stories and preferred leaving for Europe by less dangerous routes (see also 
Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007c: 15). A minority decided to make use of the 
sea-passage anyway and found certain ways to cope with the physical dangers. 
Giddens (2003: 40-41) has suggested that people in non-western societies tend to 
substitute sorcery, luck and the will of god(s), for risk. This is exactly what boat-
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migrants do in order to place the negative consequences outside of themselves. 
As one unsuccessful boat-migrant commented: 
‘Everything is in the hands of God. If he has decided that you will die tomorrow, you 
will die tomorrow. Than it does not matter whether you are on open sea, lie in your 
bed, or eat a chicken.’ 
Consequently, the possibility of dying during the trip is considered to be part 
of one’s destiny (‘the will of God’) or put in the hands of those that enact 
sorcery. As I mentioned before, one way of coping with the possibility of sorcery 
is not to tell others about your plans to leave. Partaking in magical practices is 
another means of acting out some sort of control over the harm that can be 
caused by others as well as by the forces of nature.20 Most boat-migrants see a 
marabout the day before they leave to ask whether the day of departure will be a 
good day, which in most cases is suggested that it will be.21 If the marabout 
assures the migrant about the good prospects for the day of departure, or when 
the person wants to leave anyway, he often takes part in defensive practices, such 
as wearing amulets (gris gris), take baths with special powders (also on open 
sea), or make a sacrifice assigned to him by the magical-religious leader.22 This 
is not only carried out by the boat-migrants, but also by the organizers of the trip, 
for example, by washing the boat with spiritual water. Making these efforts sug-
gests that prospective migrants and their families are well aware of the risks that 
they will face during the trip (see also Schapendonk & van Moppes 2007c: 14). 
In addition, by protecting themselves from these dangers, they make attempts to 
decrease the costs of boat-migration, in this case the possibility of dying. 
Conformist versus opportunistic driven migration 
For many young men, leaving for Europe means a possibility to respond to both 
family demands as well as to the wish for individual success. In this opportu-
nistic model of migration decision-making it is the migrant himself who decides 
to leave by boat. As the case of Ibrahima illustrates, when a person is a member 
of a large migrant network of weak ties, it is very likely that he will not be able to 
make access claims on resources in order to migrate in a legal manner. Yet, his 
membership in these types of networks can lead to relative deprivation and 
ancillary feelings of social stigmatization as a result of (selectivity of) ‘success 
                                                            
20  Protection through magic in any kind of professional or personal situation is practiced among the 
Senegalese population at large (see also Gemmeke 2004: 72; Franklin et al. 1996: 325). 
21  Only one informant mentioned that the marabout had expressed that it would not be a good day for 
departure. 
22  It can be assumed that many marabouts, not too concerned with their clients, make use of the 
opportunity to earn a lot of money. As most are aware, through newspaper articles and word by mouth 
stories that the water is capricious close to Mauritania, this is what many of them say to the potential 
boat-migrants. 
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stories’ from migrated friends. For these young men, family demands and the 
urge for individual social mobility are the ultimate goals for migration. When 
they hear of alternative routes to leave for Europe and they have contact with 
organizers, it will be very likely that these men will make use of undocumented 
migration. 
In the process of preparing for departure by boat, the undocumented migrant 
will deliberately make use of several contacts, depending on their opinion on the 
practice of boat-migration. Due to hierarchical and authoritarian relationship 
structures, family members are of special concern. It is expected that younger 
members of the family ask permission from authoritarian figures, for every 
action they want to make, as otherwise it is believed that bad fortune will befall 
upon them.23 This means that those who think about leaving by boat should ask 
their elderly for consent in order to safeguard one’s luck during the trip. For these 
young men a problem arises when the authoritarian person does not agree with 
the migration plans, as could be seen in the case of Ibrahima and his uncle. In 
this situation the migrant can decide to do several things. First of all, he can try to 
convince the senior or, when this does not work, decide to skip the plan. How-
ever, when one has made the decision to leave and already commenced some 
preparations, this person is more likely to choose not to inform seniors on the 
planned trip, which can range from the complete trip to the day of departure. As 
one unsuccessful boat-migrant explained: 
‘A lot of people that have left from here did not tell their parents about their plans to 
leave by boat, because they do not agree with this sort of migration because of the 
physical risks. The second time that I left I did not inform my parents as I knew that 
they would not agree with me leaving by boat from the first time I had left. So the 
day of departure I lied to them by saying that I was going to Thies,24 where the father 
of my older brother lives.’ 
Silence and lying is a widely used strategy among boat-migrants in order to 
act out agency within the authoritarian relationship structures. 
As a result of disagreement, which can jeopardize the planned trip, the in-
dividual migrant in general will not make use of strong family networks in the 
preparatory phase. Establishing contact with the organizers mostly runs through 
direct or indirect friendship relations. In some cases the migrant makes use of a 
trusted family member, but only when he knows that this person cannot affect the 
decision-making process, nor disagrees with the migration plans. Being able to 
collect the amount of money that is needed is sometimes facilitated by strong 
                                                            
23  As a result of these familial relationship structures, younger members of the household are never 
asked for consent and in most cases not informed about the migration plans as this information can 
only jeopardize the migration act. The same counts for the wife of a potential boat-migrant, as within 
conjugal relations it is the husband who holds authority. 
24  Thies is a city situated some 58 km east of Dakar. 
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family members, at least, when they agree with the trip. For example, one 
unsuccessful boat-migrant explained that his mother paid for the trip with money 
she got from a weekly mutual in which she participated. Nonetheless, in most 
cases the migrant himself is the one who collects the necessary financial re-
sources. This is done by borrowing money from relatives under false pretexts, 
while other heard stories are about men who sell their luxury goods, i.e., a 
television, DVD-player or large wooden beds and closets, while some also have 
savings of their own. Yet, the ability to collect a large amount of money by the 
person himself can be a plausible reason for keeping silent on the planned trip 
towards other family members. When the elderly relative does not agree, but 
knows that the migrant has enough money to pay for migration by boat, the 
migrant will be expected to distribute the money within the household and there-
fore will lose his savings as well as the possibility to migrate. 
From the data a second decision-making model has emerged, which results 
from the expectations that structure family relationships. This conformist driven 
migration behaviour is characterized by ambivalence and indicates that not all 
migrants agree with undocumented migration. This model is illustrated by the 
story of Pierre; out of a wish for social mobility, rather than minimizing financial 
risks for the household, authority figures, in his case the older sister, can decide 
to send a member of the household abroad. The same situation applied to other 
informants, as one of them explained: 
‘It was my older brother who pushed me to leave by boat. He wanted me to help the 
family and told me that the big houses belong to migrants. He wanted that as well 
and that is why he told me to leave.’ 
When another family member has decided on the migration, it is also this 
person who takes care of all the arrangements that makes the departure possible. 
He/she takes care of the contact with the owner or the recruiter, which mostly is a 
friend or acquaintance from the neighbourhood. In addition, the authority figure 
arranges a useful contact in Europe in order to support the migrant once he has 
informed this person about his arrival. Subsequently, the decision-maker is the 
one who collects the necessary financial resources that has to be paid to the 
owner or recruiter. This mostly results in them handing in their savings, and in 
the case of women, the selling of jewellery. In return for their investment remit-
tances are expected, which puts a lot of pressure on the migrant, especially when 
he fails to make it to Europe. In this situation, the disappointment among the 
other household member(s) can be so pressing for young men that they might 
decide to leave again even when they do not agree with it themselves. However, 
most will try to avoid this when the opportunity arises. Even though these young 
men operate in the same social context of hierarchical and authoritarian family 
relations as opportunistic boat-migrants, they show a reluctance to take part in 
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undocumented migration. This can be explained by the type of social networks. 
Young men, like Pierre, who are not a member of large migrant networks, are 
less likely to be affected by relative deprivation. In addition, he finds himself in 
an environment in which his strong friendship network at home disagrees with 
this kind of migration. These factors in combination with the perceived dangers 
of the trip, most likely will result in a reluctance to leave in an informal way. 
Nonetheless, when they are chosen by an authoritarian family member (or mul-
tiple), the possibility of social sanctions gives them little freedom to act other-
wise, a consequence of their embeddedness in a family structure in which it is 
expected of younger persons to obey their seniors. This is reinforced when they 
are financially dependent on this person. However, despite the authoritarian na-
ture of family relationships, chosen migrants are not “cultural dopes” of the so-
cial system. Instead, they are able to process information about the rules of their 
social relationships and based on this knowledge they will find their own space to 
act. For example, before his departure Pierre made several attempts to convince 
his sister to revise her decision, albeit without the desired effect. Even though he 
did not agree, his migration behaviour can be said to be based on a knowledge-
able and rational decision. He was aware of the social sanctions, his sister turning 
against him and possible repudiation from the family, if he would have chosen 
not to obey his sister. Not only is conformist behaviour learnt and internalized, 
the negative consequences of it are perceived to be higher than the possible risks 
of the sea-passage – social stigma and physical dangers. Consequently, these 
young men choose actively, with the little freedom they have to act otherwise, to 
leave. However, when possible, meaning when action does not result in social 
sanctions, individuals will try to surpass the norms that structure the familial 
system. This was illustrated by the case of Pierre, who lied to his sister about the 
possibility of a second attempt, in this way creating his own freedom to act by 
basing his disobedient behaviour on another person, the owner of the boat, and 
thereby preventing social sanctions. 
In this chapter I have suggested that the motivations and decisions to migrate 
by boat from Senegal to the Canary Islands are much more complex and hetero-
geneous than micro- and macro-economic theories would like us to believe. I 
have sketched the socio-cultural context in which general migration decisions are 
made. To explain the motivations and decisions of boat-migrants in particular, I 
have focused on the varying roles played by family-, friendship- and smuggling 
networks. My analysis shows that the presence of these networks and the type of 
ties influences differential undocumented migration outcomes. Two decision-
making models followed from this, of which the basis of both is the pressure to 
respond to family demands for social mobility. However, the final outcomes 
differ as a result of membership in or exclusion from certain social networks 
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upon which decisions are based, albeit from an actor perspective. On the one 
hand this has resulted in an opportunistic driven migration model, in which the 
migrant, due to his membership in certain social networks, is eager to leave in 
order to respond to family demands and to pursue his own success and indepen-
dency from the family. In order to make undocumented migration possible he 
deliberately and selectively uses his social contacts. On the other hand a con-
formist model suggests more ambivalent migration behaviour. Yet, young men 
who are ordered by an authoritarian figure to leave and who do not agree with 
this will act otherwise when possible. Both models can thus be explained from an 
agency perspective, but only when taking into account the knowledge people 
have of social relationships upon which they base their action. 
 
 
     
 
 
7 
Conclusion: Structure and agency  
in undocumented migration 
In the preceding chapters I have presented two undocumented migration models, 
which are distinctive in their unit of decision-making, the individual versus the 
household. If these cases would have been analyzed according to a rational 
choice or structural approach, both models would leave many questions unans-
wered. Conformist driven migration seems irrational from a rational choice per-
spective based on universal axioms. After all, for these men it would be more 
beneficial to run the risk of exclusion from the family, which could have been the 
social sanction when disobeying the decision of the authority figures, instead of 
the possibility of dying during the trip. Also the structural models would not have 
been able to explain why there are differences in migration outcomes among 
people with a similar standard of living. The simple and one-sided views of these 
approaches do not bring us much further in understanding differential outcomes, 
but can be overcome be applying an actor-oriented analysis, as Long (2001: 13) 
has argued: 
One advantage of the actor approach is that one begins with an interest in explaining 
differential responses to similar structural circumstances, even if the conditions ap-
pear relatively homogeneous. Thus one assumes that the differential patterns that 
arise are in part the joint creation of the actors themselves. 
In this final chapter I will argue that undocumented boat-migrants from Sene-
gal to the Canary Islands do not make decisions as atoms outside of their social 
context, nor do they adhere slavishly to impersonal social forces that are set out 
83 
 
for them. Instead, their migration behaviour can be better understood by embed-
ding their action in systems of social relationships, while recognizing the central 
role played by the migrants themselves. 
Revisiting socially constructed migration models 
Social norms and the relative freedom to act 
The model in which another member of the household selects a person to take 
part in undocumented migration can be regarded as a typical case of the col-
lective decision-making model. In this case, a senior member of the household 
does not only decides who leaves, but also makes the arrangements for the trip 
and in return expects remittances from the migrant. However, in contrast to the 
new economics of migration theory, in which it is argued that the household 
decision of migration is based on minimizing economic risks for the household, 
my study shows that it are not the poorest households which make use of boat-
migration, while the costs of sending a member of the family abroad – emotional 
as well as possible funeral costs – are high. Moreover, remittances are not ex-
pected to contribute to absolute income, but rather to a higher level of social 
status, a result of the norm for middle-class consumption. The desire to achieve 
this status is internalized and transmitted in power relations and brought into real 
life by networks of responsibilities and expectations, whereby the family is the 
most important socializing agent. Consequently, the hierarchical family struc-
tures that give the senior the power to make decisions over a younger member of 
the household can result in migration action. This is motivated by social sanc-
tions which are attached to these relations, whereby few space is left for the 
younger member to act otherwise, as would have been the case when these social 
forces were not at work. Although Giddens (1984) has argued that sanctions 
which result from informal rules are weak (as opposed to the sanctions attached 
to formal rules) my data shows that they can indeed be very strong and effective. 
In fact, in some cases the subordinate agent is unable to resist the social forces 
that impinge upon him. However, and this is important, in contrast to the new 
economics of migration, the decision of the parent does not lead to a slavishly 
following of the pressure of the social structure on the person with a relatively 
low household status, when he does not agree with the decision. Instead the per-
son over whom power is exercised will try to create his freedom to act by making 
up lies and excuses. This is an often neglected element in the existing migration 
literature in which it is mainly assumed that authority figures send a person of the 
household abroad, who cannot do anything but confirm to the dominant structure. 
This view is voiced by Fleischer (2006: 24) in a study among Cameronian docu-
mented migration behaviour: ‘(…) in some cases the parents make the [migra-
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tion] decision and the child in question has little choice other than to follow the 
parental decision’. 
 
Ambivalence 
The case of the individual migrant shows that undocumented migration decision-
making processes are more heterogeneous than the new economics of migration 
would suggest. For these young men, the act of migration in itself can be con-
sidered as a form of agency and a way to act against the dominant system of 
social expectations. Migration decisions are not always conditioned within 
households, nor based on absolute economic cost-benefit calculations by the 
individual (rational choice perspective). Rather they are motivated by the urge for 
personal autonomy and individual success, in combination with the possible 
prospect of responding to family demands. This means that individual decisions 
are based on the embeddedness of these persons in specific social relationships. 
The socially valued idea of individual success, which is a result of the emerging 
modern middle-class consumer culture, stands on an inferior place next to the 
master narrative of solidarity with the collective. Therefore, no person will open-
ly claim that they want to migrate out of a wish to become independent from the 
family (see also Riccio 2000). Consequently, the possibilities to act according to 
it are relatively small, especially when staying in the country, as a result of the 
dominant narrative of solidarity values. Because this social norm bites deep into 
time and space, it is for the individual agent difficult to make changes to it 
(Giddens 1984: 171). Therefore, for young Senegalese, changing the existing 
rules of the institution of collectivism and its related networks of expectations is 
extremely difficult and they believe that migration is one of their limited possi-
bilities to create space for their individual wishes and choices. This illustrates 
that people do not slavishly adhere to a dominant value system, but instead find 
creative ways of creating space for their individual wishes and choices. Or in the 
words of Long (2001: 16):  
‘(…) the notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process 
social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most ex-
treme forms of coercion.’ 
 
Towards a heterogeneous actor-oriented decision-making model 
This analysis of the undocumented migration decision-making process among 
Senegalese boat-migrants suggests that some adjustments have to be made to the 
new economics of migration theory, which implies that the migration decision is 
made by the household (or other larger unit) as a strategy to minimize economic 
risks. Although this model has had some explanatory power for my study, I 
would like to argue that this model overemphasizes the role of social structure in 
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which migrants are embedded, while it does not leave much room for agency of 
the individual undocumented migrant. My study therefore proposes several 
changes to the model. First of all, (undocumented) migration is not in all cases a 
household decision nor a purely collective motivated act. Instead, people do not 
only migrate as a result of accepted norms and existing power relations, but also 
out of self-interest, even when it clashes with the dominant discourse. This 
means that decisions are not solely defined by social constructions of rationality, 
but also by desires, self-interest and motivations, which in turn are in mutual 
relation with the social structure and available discourse (see also Long 2001). 
Second, when the household is the decision-making unit, this does not mean that 
the individual migrant slavishly follows the social structure. Instead, in a rela-
tively freedom of space, a person acts out his/her own agency. Finally, house-
holds in Senegal that send one of their members abroad do not act so much out of 
a desire to minimize economic risks, but more out of a motivation for social 
upward mobility. Based on these findings I suggest that further research should 
not only pay attention to the social structures in which migrants are embedded, 
but also to the agency of the individual migrants themselves. In an effort to better 
understand this duality between structure and agency, future research needs to 
collect information on the social sanctions in case a person refuses the seniors´ 
migration decision.  
In addition to family relationships at home, which are the so to speak ‘founda-
tions’ for migration behaviour in general, social networks at varying geographi-
cal localities can influence the motivation and decision for undocumented migra-
tion more specifically. In what follows I will discuss the role of these networks in 
the undocumented migration decision-making process in relation to existing so-
cial network models. 
 
Strong ties provide social capital 
Membership in strong migrant networks, such as household members and close 
friends, can provide people with important resources. As a result of family net-
works of obligations, strong migrant contacts (only close relatives), are expected 
to share finances and make future migration possible for other family members. 
Research among Mexican migrants to the United States indicated that strong 
transnational ties were one of the most important predictors of undocumented 
migration behaviour (Cohen 2004; Massey et al. 2001). Based on these studies 
and the functioning of social networks from my data, I suggest that the presence 
of transnational contacts increases the likelihood of documented migration, while 
it can be expected that the chances of undocumented migration diminish. This is 
the result of the expectation of the ones at home to make use of future benefits 
from this contact(s), who thereby safeguard the possibility of documented mi-
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gration. Yet, the absence of such a tie, or the inability to make use of its re-
sources can influence the motivation and decision for undocumented migration, 
provided that the person is a member of a large migrant network and has access 
to organizational networks (see below). Nonetheless, strong relationships do not 
all function the same. While close family members might provide finances and 
help with documented migration, close friends mainly provide information. In 
addition, it depends on the ‘sending-side’ of the migrant tie and his/her access to 
certain resources, if the ‘receiver’ can mobilize these resources. Therefore, mem-
bership in a migrant network does not equal access to social capital. It can be said 
that boat-migrants mainly circulate in migrant networks from which no resources 
can be obtained, as a result of the type of tie or because the migrants ´simply´ 
does not have access to the demanded resources himself. 
Family relations can also be of importance in other aspects of the undocu-
mented migration decision-making process, especially when the household is the 
decision-making unit. In this case the household is the unit that provides for 
financial resources, information and makes contact with the organizers in order to 
make the migration act possible. In return, the household becomes the consump-
tion unit for remittances. 
 
Cumulative causation through weak ties 
Networks between more distant contacts, i.e., friends, extended family and col-
leagues, function differently and therefore also have a differential effect on un-
documented migration outcomes. Weak ties mainly distribute migration related 
information. Granovetter (1973: 1370) has called this their strength, as weak ties 
are ‘the channels through which ideas, influences, or information socially distant 
from ego may reach him’. Due to relationship rules it is not accepted to make 
access claims on resources from these kinds of persons, i.e. visa requests and 
money. Although weak ties do not provide one with social capital, through cu-
mulative causation they shape future undocumented migration action, which oc-
curs on the personal, e.g. friends and colleagues, as well as on the community 
level. This means that the more people in a person’s network migrate (this is 
even stronger when they make use of undocumented routes), the more likely a 
person is to do the same thing, a result of the exposure to the modern desire for 
individualism and social upward mobility that are transmitted through these 
networks (see also Curran & Sugay 2001). In addition, when a person is not a 
member of such networks, which is even more likely in the interior of Senegal, 
he is less pressed to leave, as he will not feel the urgent desire to belong to the 
status of middle-class nor have that much confidence in the expected remittances 
(Ibid.: 67). For a great part this is the result of the information that is distributed, 
whereby positive information about the West that comes from weak ties is fil-
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tered out. In contrast, as a result of trust among strong ties,1 negative information 
is more accepted, thereby shaping a more realistic picture of life in Europe. This 
means that the perceived benefits of undocumented migration for people with 
strong ties decreases, which in turn reduces the likelihood of emigration.  
 
The need for a more sophisticated theory on social networks 
Social network models, as it is used in migration related research, suggest that 
potential migrants can make access claims from their migrant networks in which 
they deliberately invest for future benefits (Staring 2001: 12). This does not hold 
for undocumented boat-migrants from Senegal. Although they are a member of 
multiple transnational networks, they are not able to mobilize the resources that 
could be provided by these networks, which is the result of the norms and value 
judgments that are inherent in these relationships. Not every person who has 
access to a social network automatically has access to social capital. Instead, the 
‘giver’ in most cases avoids contact with anyone besides his close kin, thereby 
making a selection to which persons certain scarce resources are distributed. This 
means that the place of an individual in a social network determines his access to 
scarce resources (see also Wellman 1983: 157). 
Based on my data I suggest that the idea of solidarity among social networks is 
too much taken for granted in the existing migration literature and it is neglected 
that different types of transnational relationships have varying influences on the 
(undocumented) migration decision-making process. Therefore, a more sophisti-
cated view on the influence of social networks in future research is needed, 
whereby different types of relationships should be analyzed on the basis of their 
norms and resources in order to better understand their impact on migration out-
comes. 
What makes the difference? 
Having discussed the differential roles played by personal contacts, I will attempt 
to further explain how undocumented migration selectivity takes place. In other 
words, why do some leave by boat, while others don’t? Besides the influence of 
embeddedness in particular social networks and the overall desire for upward 
mobility, some other factors have to be mentioned. First of all, peer pressure 
appears to be an important aspect in the boat-migration decision-making process. 
Being surrounded by friends and neighbours who have plans to leave, or have 
left already, and who communicate these plans with each other can be an impor-
tant incentive for a person to leave himself. In contrast, when one is embedded in 
                                                            
1  Curran & Sugay (2001: 67) have suggested that the high level of trust among family members is based 
on past experiences that foster confidence. 
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a peer group in which undocumented migration is not accepted, emigration by 
boat will be less likely. However, more research is needed to better understand 
how peer groups at home shape undocumented migration behaviour. Access to 
organizational networks constitutes a further, albeit very important differentiating 
factor in migration outcomes. My data shows that the undocumented migration 
decision-making takes place within a short period of time and only when the 
supply of transport via undocumented routes is available. This is reinforced by 
the personal relationship between the organizers and the clients, which increases 
trust as well as the confidence in the chances of success. The proximity between 
the client and the organizer does not only count on the personal level, but in most 
cases also on a geographical level. This suggests that the majority of boat-
migrants live in the same area as where organizers operate, who are mainly 
former fishermen in coastal regions. For people from more inland regions boat-
migration will be a less reliable option and they will be more likely to opt for 
alternative means of migration. Finally, the financial resources of a future mi-
grant or a household can greatly influence migration behaviour. Besides having 
access to financial resources to pay for the trip, having no access to a financial 
resource base can put poor families out of reach of migration. In addition, when 
households have access to more finances, alternative and more expensive forms 
of migration will become relevant. Nonetheless, my research suggests that in 
cases when the individual is the decision-maker, the household resources do not 
automatically influence migration behaviour, as a result of the urge for autonomy 
from the family and for individual success. 
Conclusion 
This study indicates that the reality of the undocumented boat-migrant is more 
complex than some theoretical models have suggested. For those who are 
instructed by a senior family member to leave, the dependency on this person in 
addition to familial relationship expectations can leave a person with little free-
dom to act otherwise, even when he would have done so if the social forces were 
not at work. Migrants who are ‘forced’ by their family members are very well 
aware of these relationship rules and make purposive decisions based on this 
knowledge. For these persons leaving can be a result of self-interest, considering 
the consequences of social sanctions if they would refuse to migrate. Based on 
this knowledge the boat-migrant will also try to find his freedom to act other-
wise. 
Also in the case in which the individual migrant himself makes the decision to 
leave, other factors, who can be found in the social environment of the potential 
boat-migrant, are of central importance in mediating differential undocumented 
migration outcomes. I have argued that the strength and content of transnational 
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network ties, peer pressure, access to undocumented migration possibilities, be-
sides access to financial resources, are important influencing elements in un-
documented migration-decision making. These factors have to be placed in the 
socio-cultural context of the desire for middle-class status, social collectivism 
and the contrasting desire for autonomy from the family and individual success. 
I have argued, in contrast to the idea of undocumented migration support 
programmes, that boat-migrants are very well aware of the costs of migration and 
have found different ways to cope with them. It is believed that it is possible to 
protect oneself against physical risks at sea by certain magical practices, while at 
the same time these risks are placed outside of the migrant and put in the hands 
of those that enact ‘witchcraft’ and ‘sorcery’ or explained to be ‘the will of God’. 
One way of dealing with this is to keep silent about the departure to others be-
sides close kin. Social stigma is another possible cost, especially when the boat-
migrant fails to arrive in Europe. Again people attempt to decrease the social 
consequences by keeping silent to others. The possibility to lose financial re-
sources when the trip is unsuccessful is narrowed down by trust based on the 
personal relationship between the client and the organizer, in addition to the oral 
agreement in which as many successive attempts are ´promised´ when the trip is 
unsuccessful. This suggests that the costs of boat-migration, of which people are 
very well aware, are constricted. In effect, the benefits of migration – status 
enhancement, autonomy from the family and the possibility to respond to fa-
milial demands at the same time – are more motivating factors to leave. These 
social forces can make a seemingly illogical decision, from a rational choice 
perspective, understandable and shows that undocumented migration decision-
making is not solely based on individual economic cost-benefit calculations, but 
should include desires, self-interest and status. This also explains why people 
will try to leave by boat as many times as (financially) possible, as for them the 
perceived benefits and the social forces that are at work outweigh the costs of 
migration, even when this might lead to death. 
Future research is needed to collect information on undocumented migration 
behaviour in other areas in Senegal to confirm the results of my research, for 
which the Casamance (South Senegal) can be suggested to be a suitable region, 
as participation in boat-migration has developed here over the last years. In 
addition, research in the interior and rural regions from which there is not much 
involvement in boat-migration can be of interest to explain how they perceive 
boat-migration and what social factors shape this perspective. 
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